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BAKKE, WEBER AND MR. JUSTICE STEWART:
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION
ALBERT BRODERICK*
On June 28, 1978, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro-
gram of a state university medical school that reserved 16 out of 100
seats for minority applicants violated the right of a white applicant who
would otherwise have been admitted. On June 27, 1979, the Supreme
Court upheld a private employer's job training program (arranged
jointly with the plant's union) that reserved ten out of twenty places for
minority applicants, denying the asserted right of a white employee
whose exclusion had been solely because of his race.
To the Court, and to the initiated of the legal profession, there is no
conflict between the two rulings (tension perhaps, but no conflict). The
1978 case, Bakke,' involved state activity that triggered the constitu-
tional sanction of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. However, only one of the five-Justice majority rested Bakke's
win on that ground. The 1979 case, Weber,2 concerned purely private
arrangements. In that case the sole question was whether Congress had
made such private arrangements illegal by enacting Title VII, the job
discrimination provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
These two cases may be examined to ask if there has been a realign-
ment by the Court on crucial aspects of racial relations, both as to the
constitutional requirement of equal protection and the scope of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. To answer this question in practicing lawyers'
style we would scrutinize the most recent views of the present Justices,
and such hints as may be gathered from their votes. Doing this would
lead us directly to the swing Justice from Bakke to Weber-Justice Pot-
ter Stewart. These cases also give focus to an even larger question.
Does the Court have any accepted methodology in reaching its deci-
sions? This second question once was of interest chiefly to law profes-
sors and law students. However, now it touches a current concern of
the general public, whose life events are affected directly and exten-
sively by the Court. This second question, whether the nine supreme
* A.B. 1937, Princeton University; LL.B. 1941, S.J.D. 1963, Harvard University; D. Phil. 1968,
Oxford University; Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University.
1. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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decision-makers rely on law, on accepted principle, or on unreasoned
and unpredictable personal preference, is now very much in vogue.
This study addresses each of these questions, which are in fact en-
twined. It attacks the larger second question first. No judgment on the
Court's present posture on racial discrimination is intelligible without a
searching glance at the source of the Court's power. Its power to inter-
pret a congressional statute, like any court's, does not give it the final
word. A statute may be amended; however, its power, through judicial
review, to declare a federal or state act unconstitutional is all but final.
Our study first considers the origins of the Court's power. We then
observe how the power has been used in two main areas-due process
and equal protection. Only then is it time to address the first ques-
tion-the law of racial discrimination after Bakke and Weber.
I. ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The power of the Supreme Court in the American system of constitu-
tional government is rooted in the notion that the federal Constitution
is a higher law than legislation of Congress and, where applicable, than
the constitutions, legislation, and decisional law of the states. From
Marbury v. Madison3 in 1803, the Supreme Court has consistently as-
serted that "[it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is"4 and to declare unconstitutional a
law it deems contrary to the Constitution when the question is raised in
a litigated case. This assertion has never been successfully challenged.
What does it mean to say that the Constitution is a "higher law," or, as
Chief Justice Marshall called it, "a superior paramount law"5? In a
classic study entitled The 'Wigher Law" Background of American Con-
stitutional Law,6 Professor Edward S. Corwin examined the remote and
immediate historical origins of what we have come to call this power of
judicial review. A summary of his findings will serve us well here.
A. Remote Origins-Greece, Rome, and Medieval Christendom
The doctrine of a higher law superior to positive (enacted) law was
common in Greece and Rome. Aristotle and Cicero were its most in-
fluential formulators. They made the civil law of the state (ius civile)
their central concern. They stressed that this civil law was formulated
under the continuing stimulus of "natural" principles of justice (ius
3. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. Id. at 177.
5. Id.
6. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 149 (1928), reprinted in E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (Cornell Univ. Press 1955) [hereinafter cited as CORWIN]. The citations infra
are to the 1955 edition.
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naturale) based upon the nature of man. They did not make these
principles explicit, but for Cicero, at least, the chief among them was
man's reason itself (recta ratio). "Right reason" would unfold princi-
ples which were valid at all times and places. The Roman jurisconsults
and praetors identified many such natural principles of justice and ap-
plied them to the separate system of Roman law applicable to foreign-
ers, the ius gentium (a remote antecedent of international law).
Gradually many principles were adopted within what would become
the codified Roman law itself. A distinct but related doctrine-popular
sovereignty-has been attributed to the great codifier of Roman law,
Justinian: the power of the ruler (king, emperor) derived from the peo-
ple. Once this assumed delegation had taken place, however, Justinian
ascribed to the ruler the ultimate power to pronounce the law, hope-
fully guided by the principles of ius naturale as the Roman praetors had
incorporated them in the ius gentium.
In the medieval era, Thomas Aquinas and other Catholic theologians
adapted the natural law of Aristotle and Cicero as a natural moral law.
They identified this natural moral law as known to each person by vir-
tue of his or her humanity. Their claim as to the content of this natural
moral law, which they stated was known apart from divine Revelation,
was modest. In an ecclesiastical sense, the natural moral law was con-
sidered part of the eternal law of a creating God, and to a significant
extent, it corresponded to the laws given to Moses in the Ten Com-
mandments.
Positivists from the time of Hobbes have resolutely denied the reality
of a natural law distinct from the positive law of a given legal system.
Corwin was as wary as any positivist of this medieval interdisciplinary
blurring between law and moral philosophy on the one hand, and the-
ology and religion on the other. His narrative seems to step gingerly
around medieval natural law. Yet, he conceded its indirect significance
for American constitutional theory in two respects at least: (1) Accord-
ing to the Greek and Roman authors, natural law had been chiefly a
stimulus to legislators and codifiers to pass the best possible laws, and
thus natural law took flesh in an enlightened civil positive law. By con-
trast, Corwin found "the medieval conception [of natural law] was that
it checked and delimited authority from without."7 (2) Corwin viewed
the medievalists' distinction (John of Salisbury was central here) be-
tween the "tyrant" (who rules by force) and the "prince" (who rules in
accordance with laws) as foreshadowing the modern "notion of all po-
litical authority as intrinsically limited."8
7. Id. at 23.
8. Id. at 18-19.
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B. English Common Law
Although the ancient and general medieval views of "higher law"
have relevance, Corwin insists that the development of higher law doc-
trine in England was more significant to American judicial review.
"Before it [common law] was higher law it was positive law in the
strictest sense of the term, a law regularly administered in the ordinary
courts in the settlement of controversies between private individuals."9
So we must turn to the English institutions to view the enforcement
of higher law doctrines as positive law at work, "binding in some sense
upon government in all its phases"'" executive, legislative, and judicial.
Corwin sees this development in several stages that bridge 600 years
from Henry II's twelfth century establishment of a system of national
courts" to Blackstone's eighteenth century confirmation of "legislative
supremacy" on the eve of the American Revolution.
1. The common law
From its inception the common law was viewed as resting on custom.
A dispute between two private parties (i.e. for an assault or other per-
sonal injury) or between the king and private parties (criminal law, or
trespass on royal property) would be decided by a judge of one of the
various local courts on the basis of local custom. In the late twelfth and
early thirteenth centuries as a result of Henry II's new national courts,
the common law "was custom gradually rendered national, that is to
say common, through the judicial system. ... I2 The court selected
among customs. In the English courts there was at this point an aware-
ness of the ideas of natural law, which were then current throughout
western Europe, although having very little effect on the existing law as
enforced outside of England. The Ciceronian concept of natural law as
"right reason" was imported by the English judges-but significantly
modified. To Cicero it was the recta ratio of all men. "The right rea-
son which lies at the basis of the common law, on the other hand, was
from the beginning judicial right reason."' 3
What actually developed was a body of law-institutions and legal
principles and rules that were largely not the product of a "prince" or
legislature, but of the decisions of judges. There was occasional legisla-
9. Id. at 24.
10. Id. at 32.
11. "The true starting point in the history of the common law is the establishment by Henry
II in the third quarter of the twelfth century of a system of circuit courts with a central appeal
court." Id. at 25.
12. Id.
13. "Considered as an act of knowledge or discovery, the common law was the act of experts
.Id. at 26. These experts were not philosophers, or theologians, nor commentators. They
were the judges themselves. The rule applied to A v. B would be applied in the similar case of C v.
D under the accepted practice of adherence to precedent (stare decisis).
4
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tion' 4-at first proclamations of a king (often embodying political con-
cessions exacted from him, as was Magna Carta in 1215). 11 As
Parliament took form, beginning in the thirteenth century, it authored
occasional legislation which the courts would interpret in cases before
them. The judicial pronouncements in those cases chiefly constituted
"the law."
Corwin discusses the development of the common law itself as a
"higher law" largely in terms of one "event" (Magna Carta) and four
men; two of these were "commentator" judges of the national courts
(Bracton and Coke), one a philosopher (Locke), and the fourth basi-
cally a "commentator" law professor (Blackstone, also a quondam
judge). I shall note briefly only the major contribution Corwin attrib-
uted to each.
2. Bracion
At a time when Roman law, and also the higher law notions, were
being "received" on the Continent, Henry de Bracton, who was skilled
in both of these, compiled the first significant book of English law, De
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (Laws and Customs of England), a
commentary on a compilation of 2,000 common law decisions. Bracton
was sufficiently impressed with higher law notions to consider subject-
ing the king to the law. Bracton also believed that the king should be
subject to a higher law.' 6 Corwin argues, however, that Bracton had
"no idea of the modem concept of the 'rule of law.' ",1 He intimates
that to Bracton "the sole redress against tyranny is reliance on divine
vengeance." 8 Bracton had no solution to the problem of providing an
institutional control upon the acts of the king. "The measure of such
control should be the law . . . but the institution capable of applying
this test with regularity and precision has not yet disclosed itself."' 9
14. Not until the wave of legislation launched by Jeremy Bentham's program of legal reform
did legislation constitute more than an incidental aspect of English law. This contrasted with the
continent, where the law (in the period we are discussing) was largely constituted by legislative
codes (based largely on Roman law).
15. Corwin recalls, Magna Carta was "not an enactment, but.., a compact," of King John
with his protesting barons. At any rate, it was a document and as such "gave definite, tangible
embodiment to the notion of higher law." Id. at 30-31.
16. The celebrated passage is: "The King himself ought not to be subject to man, but subject
to God and to the law, for the law makes the King. Let the King then attribute to the law what the
law attributes to him, namely dominion and power for there is no King where the will and not the
law had dominion." CORWIN, supra note 6, at 27. This passage could have come from Bracton's
contemporary, Thomas Aquinas. However, Corwin points out, on the whole Bracton's conception
of law "is even by modem tests strikingly positivistic." Id. at 28.
17. Id. at 29.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 29-30.
5
Broderick: Bakke, Weber and Mr. Justice Stewart: Constitutional Theory and A
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1979
8 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
3. Coke
Coke is the central figure in Corwin's account of the development of
a higher law theory of the common law. Three of his contributions, not
mutualty consistent, had an impact both on the later development of
English constitutional law, and on what would be the new, completely
new, American theory of constitutional government.
(a) Dr. Bonham's Case
In a celebrated opinion in the Court of Common Pleas in 1610, Coke
held that the London College of Physicians could not rely upon an Act
of Parliament to justify punishing Dr. Bonham for practicing medicine
without a license. Not only did Coke assert the court's right to declare
an Act of Parliament invalid, but he suggested that its standard for
doing so need not be rooted in a superior Act of Parliament, but in the
court's concept of "reasonableness":
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law
will controul [sic] acts of parliament, and sometimes judge them to be
utterly void: for when an act of parliament is against common right
and reason, or impossible to be performed, the common law will con-
troul [sic] it and adjudge such act to be void.2°
The basis for Coke's conclusion that the College of Physicians had of-
fended against "unreasonableness" was that they had acted as com-
plaining witnesses and judges in the same case and, under the Act of
Parliament, were entitled to keep half the fine for themselves.2  Coke
claimed as the judges' prerogative the right to test parliamentary acts
by "reasonableness," a higher law claim that would later be cited by
colonial advocates of American judicial review. Such a broad claim
had not been made before in England. Coke himself would soon repu-
diate it, and the last time it seems to have been made in English law
was by Chief Justice Holt in 1701.22 Coke's enduring contribution to
the notion of higher law derives from another approach, an approach
rooted in judicial construction of the Magna Carta, and of other decla-
rations of rights in parliamentary enactments.
(b) Magna Carta and beyond
As suggested above, in 1215 Magna Carta was not itself a statute. Its
chapter 29 (39 in later editions) is of special interest as a source of what
Corwin is calling "higher law":
20. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 6, 46 (1610).
21. CORWIN, supra note 6, at 39.
22. "From Holt's time, the dictum finds no place in important judicial opinions in England;
but it does find its way into the Digests and Abridgements of the time .... Through these works,
as well as the Reports, it passed to America to join there the arsenal of weapons being accumu-
lated against Parliament's claims to sovereignty." Id. at 53.
6
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No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived of his freehold
or of his liberties or free customs, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any
manner destroyed, nor shall we go upon him nor shall we send upon
him, except by a legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.23
If originally the Magna Carta was concerned with the high vassals, by
1225 (its second issuance) it spoke of extending liberties "to people and
populace." A quarter century more and the term "common liberties" is
being used to describe the scope of the charter. Throughout a century
and a half there are (Coke finds) thirty-two royal confirmations. In
1368, near the end of the reign of Edward III, "to the normal form of
confirmation the declaration was added by statute that any statute
passed contrary to Magna Carta was null."' 24 From this time until the
anti-Stuart revival of the charter in the beginning of the seventeenth
century, the Magna Carta is in eclipse. In Coke's hands-his judicial
opinions, his arguments, his parliamentary debates, and his summary
of English law in the Institutes2 5-the Magna Carta is restored and ex-
tended to the status of a superior ("fundamental") parliamentary law.
In the Institutes Coke writes that it is called "Magna Carta, not for the
length or largeness of it. . . but. . . in respect of the great weightiness
of the matter contained in it; in a few words, being the fountain of all
the fundamental laws of the realm."' 26 Corwin recalls the benefits to
which Coke refers: "the historical procedure of the common law, the
known processes of the ordinary courts, indictment by grand jury, trial
by the 'law of the land,' habeas corpus, security against monopoly, tax-
ation by the consent of parliament.
27
Coke has given up, says Corwin, the vague concept of common right
and reason, which "could not have survived," in favor of "the doctrine
of a law fundamental, binding Parliament and king alike, a law, more-
over, embodied to a great extent in a particular document and having a
verifiable content in the customary procedure of everyday institu-
tions." 28
4. John Locke
Corwin's interest in John Locke is less in terms of his influence on
English law and constitutional theory than his impact upon American
constitutional law. To be sure, Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Govern-
23. "Nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur aut disseisiatur de libero tenemento suo vel
libertatibus vel liberis consuetudinibus suis aut utlagetur aut exuletur aut aliquo modo destruatur
nec super eum ibimus nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legalium judicium parium suorum vel per
legem terrae." Id. at 31-32.
24. Id. at 33.
25. E. COKE, INSTITUTES (1st ed. 1628).
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ment 29 was the theoretical justification of the Glorious Revolution of
1688 which definitively deposed the Stuarts. But, Corwin argues,
Locke (with Coke) was the dominant influence upon the theory of the
American Constitution, and of judicial review, which became its un-
written institutional method for enforcement of natural rights.
Corwin cites Locke's obvious dependence upon the continental revi-
val of natural law, with particular emphasis on Grotius, who stressed
its Ciceronian origins free "from any suspicion of dependence on eccle-
siastical and Papal intervention."3 For Grotius, as with Cicero, natu-
ral law is "right reason" and is at once "a law of, and a law to, God."'"
Locke also relies on "English legal tradition" in which "the entire em-
phasis . . has always been on rights of the individual rather than on
rights of the people considered in the mass. '"32 Locke's government
creates no rights; it is a "fiduciary" whose task is to make more secure
and more readily available rights which antedate it and would survive
it. Popular interpretation of natural law is the "ultimate test of the va-
lidity of civil law." True, Locke depends in the main on legislative
supremacy "for the safeguarding of the rights of the individual"33 but
legislative power is not arbitrary. "It is bound to dispense justice and
decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and
known authorised [sic] judges."34 Nor is it ultimate. "The community
perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the at-
tempts and designs of anybody, even their legislators, whenever they
shall be so foolish or so wicked as to lay and carry on designs against
the liberties and properties of the subject."35
Locke's special concern among natural rights is the right of property.
He frankly and determinedly defends the "inequality of possessions" as
harmonious with the social compact.36 He defends the "public good"
both as an objective and as a limitation of legislative action, and a
broad executive power to which "the laws themselves should in some
cases give way. . . ."I' Indeed this last is required by "the fundamen-
tal law of nature and government-viz., [tihat as much as may be, all
the members of the society are to be preserved."38
Corwin sees Locke and Coke as complementing each other:
1. "Locke's version of natural law rescues Coke's version of the Eng-
29. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (lst ed. 1690).
30. Corwin, supra note 6, at 58.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 63.
33. Id. at 67.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 68-69.
36. Id. at 69.
37. Id. at 71.
38. Id.
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lish constitution from a localized patois, restating it in the universal
tongue of the age."
2. Coke urged "the historical procedure of the common law as a per-
manent restraint . . . on the power of the English crown."
3. Coke (by rooting "fundamental law" in the Magna Carta) "rescued
the notion of fundamental law from what must sooner or later have
proved a fatal nebulosity." (By this Corwin seems to mean Coke's
own early formula of "common right and reason" from which he
later backed off.) Yet, Corwin adds, Coke's rooting fundamental
law in ancient documents risked "archaism," by making only the
ancient "fundamental."
4. Locke's movement away from historical to philosophical reasoning
offered promise for a broader development of rights but he lacked
clear institutional form for this criticism. As Corwin says, "While
he contributed to the doctrine of judicial review, it was without in-
tention." Among the three powers-legislative, executive, and ju-
dicial-Locke stood for legislative supremacy. This was, it is true,
a legislative supremacy "within the law" and subject to the peo-
ple-but unlike Coke, Locke does not "reveal any perception of
giving imperative written form to the constitutional principles
which he formulated." By contrast, "The hardfisted Coke, writing
with a civil war ahead of him instead of behind him, was more
prescient."
39
Coke and Locke, in their combined influence in the American colo-
nies, set the stage for the doctrine of revolution (Locke), for the value of
a written constitution (Coke), for the articulation of natural rights in
Bills of Rights (Locke and Coke), and for the post-Constitutional insti-
tution and development of a doctrine of judicial review. They did so in
face of an active pre-Revolutionary generation in America that had
been schooled in an unqualified "legislative supremacy" given visibility
and credence by Blackstone.
5. William Blackstone
By the time that the first edition of Blackstone's Commentaries (1765-
69) appeared in Philadelphia in 1771-72 (1400 copies having been or-
dered in advance), the full impact of Coke and Locke had been felt in
the colonies, which were by then engaged in sharp dispute with En-
gland. Blackstone reflected, rather than created, the new constitutional
theory finally accepted in England-unqualified legislative
supremacy.4 ° Corwin marks the key date as 1706, the debate on the
Declaratory Act. 4' Blackstone popularized the "new" doctrine (deriv-
ing from Thomas Hobbes) in his celebrated work. He rejected the posi-
39. Id. at 72, 68.
40. Id. at 85.
41. Id. at 83-84.
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tions of Coke and Locke that Parliament's power was not an unlimited
one. The doctrine of Hobbes prevailed. Parliament "can, in short, do
everything that is not naturally impossible, and therefore some have
not scrupled to call its power by a figure rather too bold, the omnipo-
tence of Parliament. True it is, that what the Parliament doth no au-
thority upon earth can undo. 4
2
Corwin points out that the mood in the colonies during the pre- and
post-Revolutionary days was receptive to this doctrine of legislative
sovereignty which threatened to submerge all the rights of man "in a
single right, that of belonging to a popular majority, or more accu-
rately, of being represented by a legislative majority."43 The state legis-
lature was closer to the people than the remote Continental Congress,
and within the state "the legislature was conceived to stand nearer the
people than the other departments."" Why then, Corwin asks, did not
legislative sovereignty establish itself in our constitutional system? His
twofold answer concludes his study:
1. In the "American written Constitution, higher law at last attained a
form which made possible the attribution to it of an entirely new
sort of validity, the validity of a statute emanatingfrom the sovereign
people." This automatically dissolved the notion that the ordinary
legislative organ itself was the supreme law making body.
2. "Even statutory form could hardly have saved the higher law as a
recourse for individuals had it not been backed up by judicial re-
view."
4 5
The Constitution of 1787, providing for lifetime federal judges, was
supplemented by the Bill of Rights (first ten amendments) in 1791.
There was not a word in either about judicial review. That basic doc-
trine of American constitutional law awaited declaration by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison in 1803.46
C. The Beginnings
The Constitution which was produced in Philadelphia in the summer
of 1787, and ratified by the required number of states after a bitter
debate, was a compromise. Neither those who would have kept the
loose federation of autonomous states, nor those who would have a
strong national government worked their will. What emerged was a
constitutional federalism in which there was a built-in structural ten-
sion between these two views. Likewise, there was compromise be-
tween those who contended for a strong executive, and those favoring




46. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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the new English model of legislative supremacy. There was hardly a
voice for judicial domination. The document which emerged has com-
monly been termed an implementation of Montesquieu's model of sep-
aration of powers, checks and balances being a form of popular
protection against governmental domination of any kind. The first
three articles of the Constitution were divided explicitly among legisla-
tive (article I), executive (article II), and judicial power (article III).
This was purely the result of last minute touching up, by the Conven-
tion's Committee on Style, of decisions previously made at the Conven-
tion. What the Convention finally enacted was truly in the
Montesquieu mold. Here, as with its federalism, there were deliber-
ately built-in structural tensions, overlappings as well as mutual checks
among the three branches, which made for inevitable future disputes
that somehow would have to be resolved.
In Marbury v. Madison4 7 in 1803, Madison, Jefferson's Secretary of
State, denied Marbury a commission as judge that had been signed and
sealed in the closing hours of the Adams' administration. Marbury
sued Madison by original action in the Supreme Court, and Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, speaking for the Court, recognized that Marbury indeed
had a "right" to this commission, and that where there is a right it is the
policy of the law to grant a remedy. However, Marbury could not re-
cover because he had not proceeded with an appropriate remedy, even
though he followed the specific terms contained in the Judiciary Act of
1789, which purported to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction of such a
case. Marshall said that the act was contrary to the constitutional pro-
vision limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To make this
judgment dismissing Marbury's suit, Marshall had to answer two ques-
tions that the court had not faced before. First, when a provision of
legislation conflicts with the language of the Constitution, which should
prevail? Marshall had no trouble here, and simply stated that the Con-
stitution was the "higher law," expressly deriving from the people. In
case of conflict48 the Constitution was supreme. The very words of arti-
cle VI, section 2,4 9 support this conclusion. Second, assuming that the
Constitution is to prevail over conflicting Congressional legislation,
who is to make the ultimate judgment? Marshall answered this ques-
tion: "[t]he [C]ourt." He thus gave birth to the doctrine of judicial
review, the fulcrum on which rests almost all of what we have come to
47. Id.
48. Marshall's critics have delighted to point out that this conclusion was not so obvious as he
made it sound. In post-Revolutionary France, the written constitution did not prevail in case of
conflict with subsequent legislation.
49. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land .. " Marshall's critics reply that this provision was di-
rected against conflict with state action, and not to conflicts within the national government itself.
11
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know as American constitutional law.5°
The irony was that the question, whether a court could declare an act
of Congress unconstitutional, is not specifically dealt with in the Con-
stitution. Here was the supreme structural tension, and the Court re-
solved it in favor of itself. By so concluding, did it assume the
prerogative to resolve all subsequent constitutional tensions? Yes, pro-
vided that the answer was necessary for the decision of a case properly
brought before the Court for resolution. Marbury lost not because he
had shown no "right" to his commission; he lost because the case was
not one properly before the Supreme Court for resolution, in light of
the Court's conclusion that the Constitution barred it from taking origi-
nal jurisdiction of a suit of mandamus which Congress had mistakenly
given it.
The Supreme Court at first made light use of its weapon of
supremacy. Not until the Dred Scott5' case would it declare another
act of Congress unconstitutional. However, in important cases involv-
ing the states, the Court did declare acts of state legislatures to be in
violation of the "Supreme Law of the land." For example, in the
celebrated Dartmouth College52 case in 1819, the state legislature's ac-
tion in changing a provision of the college's charter was held a viola-
tion of the constitutional provision "against impairing the obligation of
contract."53 This provision was used (some said) in vindication of the
"natural right" of property celebrated by John Locke. In making such
an evaluation, the Court came to recognize that the Constitution did
imply that the state had a zone of proper action, termed its "police
power" (health, welfare, safety, morals). It was for the Court to deter-
mine in each case whether the state's "assertion" of its "police power"
violated a specific constitutional provision. However, the Court held in
Barron v. Baltimore54 in 1833 that the Bill of Rights, the first ten
amendments (including the due process provision of the fifth amend-
ment), was not a limitation against the states, but only against offend-
ing action by the national government. The most frequent clause relied
on by the Court to overturn state laws prior to the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment in 1870 was article I, section 8, which provided
that "Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate commerce be-
50. As critics point out some countries leave final determination of constitutionality to the
legislature, while granting that the constitution is supreme law (Switzerland). In a Massachusetts
case as late as 1854 Chief Justice Shaw assumed that the legislature, not the court, should have
final word on what was "equal protection of the law." Roberts v. Boston, Mass. (5 Cush.) 198
(1849).
51. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
52. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
53. U.S. CONST., art I § 10.
54. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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tween the states."55 Not until the passage of the fourteenth amendment
with its due process and its equal protection clauses applicable to state
action does the Supreme Court turn productively to the question of just
what rights are specifically protected under the constitutional provi-
sions that say that "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."56 It is primarily within
the context of these clauses that constitutional consideration of rights
has taken place. I will first consider what the Court has done to give
content to the notion of due process, and then turn to equal protection
with which the Court has been preoccupied in most recent years.
II. "DUE PROCESS OF LAW"
Not until 1855 did the Supreme Court face the question how to de-
termine whether action by the national government violated the fifth
amendment requirement of due process. Was the clause to be an open-
ended vehicle for judicial pronouncement of constitutional rights? In
its first answer to this question in Murray v. Hoboken Land and Im-
provement Company,57 the Court's approach was cautious. Two quite
objective tests were coupled. The first was unimaginative: the terms of
the Constitution-specifics contained in the Bill of Rights itself; this
would make the due process clause largely duplicative of rights already
identified. The second test was historical, and equally conservative:
"due process" was in effect "old process"-"those settled usages and
modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of En-
gland before the immigration of our ancestors, '58 provided they are not
"unsuited" to our need.
The next formulation of a constitutional standard to measure claims
that a party's rights had been infringed for want of due process did not
come until after the fourteenth amendment had been adopted in 1870
making, as we have seen, claims of violation of due process applicable
against the states. A fresh concern was present here. Although a cata-
log of limitations against abridgement of rights by federal power was
contained in the specific language of the first eight amendments, the
only sources of constitutional limitations on state action in the new
fourteenth amendment were three clauses of great generality-the due
process and equal protection clauses already referred to, and a clause
preventing a state from denying to any citizen the privileges and immu-
55. The Marshall court gave a broad national scope to this clause. The Jacksonian court
under Taney was more oriented to sustaining state conduct under the clause. The pendulum has
since swung back and forth. And so it has with the obligation of contract clause.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
57. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
58. Id. at 277.
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nities of citizens of the United States (a clause destined to have a very
sparse history).
The year 1877 produced a more open-ended but unilluminating step
in the search for "the intent and application of due process" in David-
son v. New Orleans.59 The case yielded another "formula" which is
still occasionally voiced by the Court: "the gradual process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall re-
quire."" Unlike Murray's test, this left the door wide open to judicial
pronouncements of new constitutional rights. The Murray test was
supplemented, rather than displaced, in Hurtado v. California,6" an
1884 case that produced what could fairly be called (with Murray) the
second landmark in due process formulation.
The right to indictment by a grand jury prior to trial had long been
enforced in the English courts as an ingredient of the historic rights of
Englishmen. Hurtado had been convicted in a California court after
indictment by simple filing of an "information" citing the details of the
charge, rather than by grand jury process. Hurtado contended that his
right to this "due process" had been abridged, in violation of the four-
teenth amendment, since Murray had specified that "due process" is at
least "old process." In rejecting this view, Justice Matthews for the
Supreme Court opened the gate wide for an evolving judicial declara-
tion of natural rights. The basic constitutional guarantees of due proc-
ess, said Matthews, do not merely consecrate "particular forms of
procedure" (as Murray had suggested); "they constitute the very sub-
stance of individual rights to life, liberty and property."62 In what
would become a landmark phrase (very reminiscent of Coke) the Court
added that these rights consist in "those fundamental principles of lib-
erty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political insti-
tutions."63 These would be identified by judicial pronouncement. Was
there no way to identify them once and for all (as the Murray formula
had attempted)? No, for they are not rigidly frozen but "developed by
a progressive growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances and
situations of the forms and processes found fit to give, from time to
time, new expression and greater effect to modern ideas of self-govern-
ment." It was a curious opinion, on the one hand upholding state
legislative action that wiped out what had been a traditional "right"
secured to Englishmen under the courts' implementation of the Magna
Carta. On the other hand it gave wide scope to the Supreme Court to
59. 96 U.S. (60 How.) 97 (1877).
60. Id. at 104.
61. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
62. Id. at 532.
63. Id. at 535.
64. Id. at 530.
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identify new constitutional rights-but by what criteria? Matthews'
brush was broad: history, comparative law, natural law (in the sense of
"justice-suum cuique tribuere," give to each his own, the Justinian def-
inition), and, finally, experience.65 The search was always for "funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice." The state could not violate
these for "[1]aw is something more than mere will exerted as an act of
power."66 Still in Hurtado, the state had stayed within permissible
bounds in failing to furnish a grand jury because, the Court held, this
right was not "fundamental."
Hurtado highlighted what was to be the continuing preoccupation of
the Supreme Court in identifying rights secured by due process. Of the
two due process clauses, the one in the fifth amendment was binding
only against the national government and the District of Columbia, the
other in the post-Civil War fourteenth amendment extended to "state
action" that infringed asserted rights. Subsequent to Hurtado, the
Court invariably found itself interpreting due process in challenges to
state infringement of rights. Furthermore, prior to Hurtado the Court
had limited the range of rights protected by due process to specific pro-
cedural guarantees earlier recognized by the English courts, and re-
fused to use the due process clause to uphold claims of rights to
property and contract. The argument for such a "natural rights" inter-
pretation had been made in dissent by Justice Field in the celebrated
Slaughter-House Cases67 in 1873, and in a series of later cases. In 1897
the Court adopted the Field view,6 8 and for the next forty years due
process interpretation was dominated by what one author titled "The
Revival of Natural Law Concepts,"69 and what Corwin called "princi-
ples of Lockian individualism and of Spencerian Laissez Faire."7 A
new chapter of due process, substantive due process striking at state
economic legislation, was sketched out and written. It was an era of
judicial supremacy in the economic area that paralleled resolute judi-
cial self-effacement in the field of personal liberties. Early in this era
the Court made its third self-conscious effort to chart out a test of the
applicability of the due process clause. In so doing, it rebuffed a seri-
ous revolt by dissenting Justice Harlan that would have required the
Court to recognize each right identified by the first eight amendments
65. Id. at 531.
66. Id. at 535.
67. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
68. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). This view also prevailed in later cases. Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (a fifth amendment case); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
69. C. HAINES, REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930).
70. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REV. 643, 646
(1909).
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as secured against the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
This third landmark case was Twining v. New Jersey7 in 1908. New
Jersey practice permitted a judge to comment critically to the jury
when a defendant exercised his admitted privilege not to take the stand
in a criminal case. Twining attacked this state practice as a violation of
his privilege against self-incrimination, which he asserted to be within
the protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Harlan, in dissent, contended that such judicial comment in a
federal court would clearly be a violation of the fifth amendment privi-
lege. This entailed that such comment in a state court was a violation
of fourteenth amendment due process because, Harlan argued, the
fourteenth amendment "incorporated" the first eight amendments of
the Constitution, and specifically secured against the states those rights
which the federal Bill of Rights had secured against federal action.72
Justice Moody, for the Court, rejected this contention. In denying that
Twining's constitutional rights had been infringed, he reformulated the
measure of due process. There were, he ruled, three complementary
tests of due process: 1) old process (Murray); but 2) not every old proc-
ess (Hurtado); 3) old or new, due process would bar state deprivation
only of those processes which constituted "established principles of pri-
vate rights and distributive justice,"73 "immutable principles of justice
which inhere in the very idea of free government,"74 "fundamental
rights."7 5 Whereas "property" rights and "contract" rights, the Court
said, clearly met this test, the privilege against self-incrimination (in
this nuance at least) did not. The Twining formula seemed to restate
Justice Matthews' Hurtado test in its emphasis on "fundamental
rights"; its decisive intonations would be Court doctrine until the crimi-
nal rights revolution of the Warren Court four decades later. Mean-
while, the Supreme Court's judicial review would be sparingly
employed within the sphere of procedural due process.
Palko v. Connecticut76 in 1937 gave us what can be called the fourth
major formulation of due process. It was not worlds apart from
Hurtado and Twining, but it came from the hands of Justice Benjamin
Cardozo, one of the few Justices of the Supreme Court who had de-
fined for all in advance of his appointment precisely what he conceived
71. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
72. The first attempts at the "incorporation" argument were made in argument of counsel in
Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887) and in a dissent by Justice Field in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 323 (1892). Justice Harlan had argued the point in his dissent in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S.
581, 605 (1900).
73. 211 U.S. at 101.
74. Id. at 102.
75. Id.
76. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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the judicial function to be."
Palko was indicted for first degree murder. However, the jury con-
victed him of second degree murder and, instead of the death penalty,
he received a life sentence. Connecticut law permitted the state to ap-
peal the sentence. It did so, and won a new trial which resulted in a
first degree murder conviction and a death sentence. Palko appealed,
claiming he had been subjected to double jeopardy. He argued that
this violated a specific right guaranteed by the fifth amendment against
federal action. It therefore must be conceived as "fundamental," and
thus guaranteed against state infringement by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Ultimately, putting chief reliance on Twin-
ing, Cardozo and the Supreme Court ruled that there was no violation
of Palko's rights by the state practice. In doing so Cardozo took note of
developments since Twining in the field of personal rights. He then
reaffirmed Twining's "fundamental rights" doctrine in a craftsman's
language that became the due process formula of the Supreme Court
for a quarter century, and still claims adherents among today's Jus-
tices.7"
The major due process innovations by the Court between Twining
and Palko had been in the area of the first amendment, with its guaran-
tees of speech, press, assembly, and religion. It was argued that if any
rights were "fundamental" and thus entitled to protection against state
action, these first amendment rights certainly were. The Court at first
resisted.79 Then, in a series of cases from 1925 to 1937, it agreed that
these rights, secured against federal action by the specific language of
the first amendment,"° were entitled by the fourteenth amendment due
process clause to be protected against infringement by the states."'
In the Scotsboro murder trials,82 a celebrated 1935 state case with
racial overtones on a national level, the Court ruled that the right to
counsel might be sufficiently "fundamental" to be required by due
process. The sixth amendment guaranteed the right to "assistance of
counsel" in the national courts. The Court conceded that counsel was
not guaranteed at common law at the time of the enactment of the
Constitution. Still, it found the Murray formula no longer a barrier.
77. B. CARDO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
78. Cardozo's formula (discussed below) has been particularly esteemed by Justices Frank-
furter, Harlan, and Powell.
79. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I, "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment .
81. By 1937, the Court had decided cases involving speech, press, and assembly. The religion
cases would follow in 1946. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (speech); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1933); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (press); De-
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly).
82. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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All nine Justices (including Justice Butler who dissented) agreed in
Powell that effective "assistance of counsel" was required by fourteenth
amendment due process in the circumstances of that case. The Court
narrowly confined itself to the unusual facts of the case at hand, "a
capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance,
feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like."8 3
In Palko Justice Cardozo resisted the argument that, as with the first
amendment cases and the right to counsel, the double jeopardy claim
of the defendant should be viewed as "absorbed" from the Bill of
Rights into the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Cardozo's
chief reliance was on Twining, which had recognized "that some of the
personal rights safeguarded by the first eight amendments against na-
tional action may also be safeguarded against state action"'84 by the
fourteenth. This is so, not because those rights are enumerated in the
first eight amendments, but because they are included in the conception
of due process; 85 that is, because the rights asserted are "fundamental."
How was the Court to determine whether an asserted right was one of
the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions"?8 6 Was it a mere matter of
judicial whim? No, said Cardozo, although there might be cases on
both sides of the "fundamental" line. There was a unifying, rational
principle that would place them here or there. Did the statute or deci-
sion subject defendant "in the particular situation" to "a hardship so
acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it"?" Finally, in the
standard (or restatement of Twining) that was to endure, did the statute
or decision defile immunities which were "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" (again, "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty" 88)? Did the state's second trial of Palko after a criminal appeal
violate this principle? "The answer surely must be 'no.' . . . A recipro-
cal privilege, subject at all times to the discretion of the presiding judge,
(citation omitted), has now been granted to the state. There is here no
seismic innovation. The edifice of justice still stands, in its symmetry,
to many, greater than before."89 The language was resonant and ma-
jestic. The voice of the Justices was hardly a step away from the 1877
case's explanation9" of due process as "the gradual process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall re-
83. Id. at 71.
84. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 n.4 (1937).
85. Id.
86. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
87. 302 U.S. at 328.
88. Id. at 325.
89. Id. at 328.
90. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
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quire."'"
The Court almost routinely applied the Palko formula in the 1947
case of Adamson v. California,9 z a case that produced a dissent by Jus-
tice Black that missed becoming majority doctrine by a single vote.
The revival of the Harlan "incorporation" doctrine in that dissent, and
the "classic debate" (Justice Brennan's phrase)93 that ensued, laid bare
a bitter division in the Supreme Court as to the means of identifying
constitutionally protected rights under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
Between Palko in 1937 and Adamson in 1947 a major revolution had
taken place on the Supreme Court. Under pressure of a series of ap-
pointments by President Roosevelt, carefully screened for their hostility
to judicial veto of state and national economic and social legislation,
the Court had specifically renounced its previous activism under the
banner of "property" and "freedom of contract" and "due process." In
the same period it had moved with considerable vigor against state leg-
islation which brushed against the newly protected rights of free speech
and press, assembly and religion. What should be the posture of this
New Deal Court in the area of procedural due process? Where there
had been a broad agreement as to substantive (economic and social)
due process that activism was to be renounced, here it became apparent
that the Justices differed widely.
The problem, as seen by Justice Black, was how to protect the liber-
ties so recently confirmed against state action, such as speech, press and
counsel, from intrusion by a future court, and yet forestall intrusion by
a future court on the prerogatives of the states in the economic field?
Black's answer, as old as Lord Coke's, was to revive Justice Harlan's
lost cause in his Maxwell and Twining dissents: that due process rights
were measured by, and limited to, the first eight amendments of the
Constitution.
Adamson in 1947 gave Justice Black his opportunity to present this
position. Under California law the failure of a defendant to explain or
deny evidence against him could be commented upon by the court and
by counsel, and considered by the jury. Adamson was convicted of
murder in the first degree, and he claimed that this practice used
against him violated his right against compulsory self-incrimination,
specifically guaranteed as to federal action by the fifth amendment,
and, he argued, implicitly against state action by the due process clause
of the fourteenth. It was, of course, Twining all over again. The de-
fendant argued that Twining should be reversed. The Court, five to
91. Id. at 104.
92. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
93. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
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four, reaffirmed Twining, both on the self-incrimination issue and on its
methodology (as annotated by Palko). Justice Black strongly attacked
Twining. He demanded that it be overruled both on its precise holding
(on self-incrimination), and on its general theory of due process (" 'the
natural law' theory of the Constitution upon which it relies"9 4 ). The
debate was launched and continued, without clear resolution, for
twenty years. In its course, the Black "incorporation" argument never
secured majority support, and neither did the Court ever expressly re-
nounce either the "fundamental rights" measure of Twining, or the
Cardozo refinement: "concept of ordered liberty" as measures of due
process. However, the bitter clashes of the "classic debate," especially
between Justices Black and Douglas, on the one hand, and Justice
Frankfurter (and later Justice Harlan) on the other, gave more than
customary visibility to the wide difference of views on the Court (as
there was off the Court) as to just what the Justices were (and should
be) doing when confronted with assertions of constitutional rights. If
Black lost his battle for "incorporation" of all the Bill of Rights in the
fourteenth amendment's due process, he sat on the Court to see one by
one various individual provisions of the first eight amendments recog-
nized as "fundamental,"95 and thus applicable against state action as
an ingredient of due process.
These rights just noted are all reduplications of specific rights listed
as such in the first eight amendments. There were other rights newly
recognized that were not in the first eight, but these were few: the
"right to travel,"96 and the "right to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt"9 7 were given standing by the Court. Although highly spoken of
earlier by the Court as a candidate for "rightship," education was ruled
not a "fundamental" right within the context of Rodriguez,9" an equal
protection case that will be discussed later. Nor would the Court recog-
nize a right to a judicial reminder to the jury of a presumption of inno-
cence in a criminal case.99
In an opinion that blurs over any intelligible explanation of what the
Court had been doing in the two decades since Adamson, Justice White
wrote for the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana,"° a 1968 case applying the
94. 332 U.S. at 59.
95. The provisions styled not "fundamental" (hence, not applicable to the states) are the
grand jury provision of the fifth amendment (see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)) and
the civil jury provision of the seventh amendment.
96. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
97. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
98. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See text accompanying
note 171 iPfra.
99. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). In that case the Supreme Court held that
failure to give a requested charge as to a presumption of innocence denied defendant a fair trial in
the circumstances of that case. However, the court declined to make a per se rule.
100. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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jury trial provision (somewhat) to the states. White stepped back from
the notion of Hurtado and Twining that the "fundamental" aspect of
rights was tied into a universal acceptance. More in line with the Coke
rather than the Lockean heritage, he restricted the notion of fundamen-
talism to Anglo-American institutions. He could have done otherwise
and termed a jury not "fundamental," since most systems of justice do
not use juries at all. Unless Rodriguez means that the era of new rights
has been closed (hardly likely), we are no closer than before to under-
standing what standards guide judges in determining constitutional
rights. True, this is much the way the common law has always devel-
oped. From Coke we learned that "right reason" is judicial reason.
The positivists are willing to pay the price of closing off future rights to
protect (against the judges) the rights already recognized. To others
this seems less rational than to run the risk from the vagaries of judicial
interpretation.
III. "EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS"
A wave of legislation and constitutional amendments'I3 after the
Civil War bequeathed to the American polity questions concerning
rights of persons that courts, legislatures, and executives continue to
address somewhat in a haze. Of the three constitutional amendments,
it would have seemed that the thirteenth0 2 (abolishing slavery) and the
fifteenth °3 (preventing denial of franchise on racial grounds) were
straightforward enough; nevertheless, even these puzzled the courts for
a time. An observer contemporary with the enactment of the four-
teenth amendment, t with its many overlapping and, perhaps, contra-
dictory provisions, could have predicted that the Supreme Court would
have difficulty sorting it all out 110 years later. He would have been
101. In addition to the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, see notes 102-04 in-
fra, these were chiefly, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,
"Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XV,
"Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. . ..
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article.
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right. He would perhaps have been surprised that for all its difficulty
with due process, the Supreme Court would find itself most in the dark
with the fourteenth's provision that "no state shall deny to any person
... equal protection of the laws."'' 0 5 Our original spectator could
hardly have anticipated that a great deal of the Court's confusion
would be of its own making.
In those decisions that were most contemporaneous with adoption of
the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court did not have trouble in
discerning the meaning of equal protection and the "evil to be reme-
died by this clause."'0 6 In the Slaughter-House Cases" 7 in 1873, the
Court upheld a state-sanctioned monopoly of slaughter-houses against
the plaintiff's claim that his constitutional right to pursue a calling had
been infringed by the monopoly. The Court had its first occasion to
pass on the scope of the various clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
By way of overview the Court looked at the three Civil War Amend-
ments as a whole:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which
none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and
the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppres-
sions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
him. It is true that only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions
the [Niegro by speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as
true that each of the other articles was addressed to the grievances of
that race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.'0 8
Turning to the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, and the spe-
cific clauses which included involuntary servitude, privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States, equal protection of the laws,
and due process of law, the Court said, "The most cursory glance at
these articles discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in connection
with the history of the times, which cannot fail to have an important
bearing on any question of doubt concerning their true meaning."'"
This history, the Court went on, centered on slavery:
The institution of African slavery, as it existed in about half the
states of the Union . ..culminated in the effort, on the part of most of
the states in which slavery existed, to separate from the Federal govern-
ment, and to resist its authority. This constituted the War of the Rebel-
lion, and whatever auxiliary causes may have contributed to bring
105. Id.
106. See text accompanying note 112 infra.
107. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
108. Id. at 71-72.
109. Id. at 67.
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about this war, undoubtedly the overshadowing and efficient cause was
African slavery.
In that struggle, slavery, as a legalized social relation, perished. It
perished as a necessity of the bitterness and force of the conflict .
Hence the thirteenth article of amendment .... "'
That the main purpose of the fourteenth amendment's first section de-
fining citizenship "was to establish the citizenship of the [Niegro can
admit of no doubt." The Court's comment on due process was modest,
simply that its purpose was to extend the due process that had limited
the federal government from the beginning (by the fifth amendment)
by placing "the restraining power over the states in this matter in the
hands of the federal government." '
The Court next considered the equal protection clause:
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading
purpose of them which we have already discussed, it is not difficult to
give a meaning to this clause. The existence of laws in the States where
the newly emancipated [N]egroes resided, which discriminated with
gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be
remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden." 2
Finally, the Court turned to section 5, the congressional enforcement
clause of the fourteenth amendment:
If, however, the States did not conform their laws to its requirements,
then by the fifth section of the article of amendment Congress was au-
thorized to enforce it by suitable legislation. We doubt very much
whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination
against the [N]egroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be
held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a
provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be
necessary for its application to any other." 3
In Ex Parte Virginia" 4 in 1880 this theme was continued:
One great purpose of these Amendments was to raise the colored
race from that condition of inferiority and servitude in which most of
them had previously stood, into perfect equality of civil rights with all
other persons within the jurisdiction of the States. They were intended
to take away all possibility of oppression by law because of race or
color. ' 5
In Strauder v. Virginia," 6 decided the same day, a conviction of a
black citizen was reversed because blacks had been excluded from the
110. Id. at 68.
111. Id. at 73, 68-69.
112. Id. at 81.
113. Id. The court explained the fifteenth amendment as similarly motivated by the convic-
tion that blacks "living in the midst of another and dominant race, could never be fully secured in
their person and their property without the right of suffrage." Id. at 7 1.
114. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
115. Id. at 344-45.
116. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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grand jury which indicted him. The Court repeated the above asser-
tions from Slaughter-House, and added:
It was in view of these considerations the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment
was framed and adopted. It was designed to assure to the colored race
the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by
white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general
government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the
States.
If this is the spirit and meaning of the amendment, whether it means
more or not, it is to be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes of
its framers. "7
In all these cases, and in others,"' there was no disagreement that
the fourteenth amendment had accorded rights to others than blacks.
So too with the thirteenth. Thus, in Slaughter-House, the Court said:
Undoubtedly while [N]egro slavery alone was in the mind of the Con-
gress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of
slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie
labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race
within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make it
void. " 9
And in Ex Pare Virginia the Court had also noted that the purpose of
the due process and equal protection clauses "was to secure equal
rights to all persons. ... "120 This was reiterated in Strauder as self-
evident, but the Court immediately underscored the reasons for special
concern for the emancipated black citizens with "the right to exemption
from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,-ex-
emption from legal discrimination, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others en-
joy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the
condition of a subject race."'' The Court then stressed the notion of
discrimination in the sense of inflicting the stigma of inferiority:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly de-
nied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law,
as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in
other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed
by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race
that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others. 122
117. Id. at 306-07.
118. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), for example, the equal protection clause was
employed to give relief to Chinese laundrymen who had been discriminated against by adminis-
tration of a statute on racial grounds.
119. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72.
120. 100 U.S. at 347.
121. 100 U.S. at 308.
122. Id.
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This notion of invidious discrimination under the fourteenth amend-
ment comprising "racial slur or stigma" would be briefly revived by the
Court in 1977123 on the eve of the decision in Bakke.
2 4
The CivilRights Cases 25 in 1883 resulted in a serious setback to the
use of congressional legislation under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. Ex Parte Virginia had noted: "[I]t was to secure equal
rights to all persons, and, to insure to all persons the enjoyment of such
rights, power was given to Congress to enforce its provisions by appro-
priate legislation."'' 26 But the CivilRights Cases set aside congressional
provisions granting equal access to all races in specific public facilities
on the ground that there had been no "state action" shown which de-
nied equal access, and thus no need for the "corrective" legislation
'which alone, the Court said, section 5 permits. In perhaps its most
damaging aspect, the opinion also refused to uphold the civil rights
legislation as permitted by the thirteenth amendment's design to pro-
hibit badges of slavery (such as segregated public facilities). Despite
Slaughter-House's contrary indications, the Court now denied that the
thirteenth reached anything but slavery itself.
For almost three-quarters of a century following the Civil Rights
Cases of 1883, the Supreme Court disdained the views of those earlier
decisions, contemporaneous to passage of the Civil War Amendments,
that the central (if not exclusive) purpose of the amendments was to
foster the integration of the former slaves and their descendants into
American society; and that the chief vice of racial discrimination was
the personal wound of stigma, beyond short-changing blacks on mate-
rial benefits of the society.
A commission had been established in 1877 to settle the disputed
presidential election of 1876 between the Democrat, Samuel Tilden,
and the Republican, Benjamin Harrison. The deciding vote on the
commission in favor of Harrison, who had received only a minority of
the popular vote, was cast by Supreme Court Justice Bradley. The con-
ventional wisdom of the day saw a trade-off here that would insure an
end to Reconstruction and of an expansive view of the civil rights of
the new black citizen.
It has been persuasively argued2 7 that the first fruits of this "com-
promise of 1877" were Justice Bradley's restrictive opinion for the
Court in the Civil Rights Cases. Thereafter, so far as racial matters
were concerned, the fourteenth amendment fell into a not innocuous
123. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
124. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
125. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
126. 100 U.S. at 339-40.
127. See Scott, Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendment From the
Slaughter-House Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 552 (1971).
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desuetude, as did the thirteenth. The ground had been carefully laid in
the Civil Rights Cases for the Court's decision in 1896, a decision that
would leave a mark on American race relations and the rights of black
citizens that has since proven itself quite indelible. This was the case of
Plessy v. Ferguson 28 by which the Supreme Court made itself, and re-
mained for fifty years, an integral part of the problem of continued
racial discrimination in American society.
From the time of Plessy, race became a permissible basis for denying
citizens the use of public facilities. Louisiana explicitly denied black
citizens the use of railroad facilities used by whites. According to the
Supreme Court, Plessy had stated no denial of equal protection rights
because "separate" facilities were available to blacks, and "separate"
facilities were not unequal. This was the prevailing formula in the
Supreme Court in racial discrimination cases until Brown v. Board of
Education 29 in 1954. Over Justice Harlan's eloquent protest, the
Plessy Court resonated the Civil Rights Cases' philosophy that racial
discrimination was largely a private, perhaps imagined, fault, and not
actionable as a "badge of slavery"; nor was publicly enforced separa-
tion of the races in public facilities a denial of equal protection so long
as there was a rough "equality" in "separate" facilities. Justice Harlan
warned in dissent that the constitutional question was not whether
"material" equality was achieved. It was, rather, whether the four-
teenth amendment had banned publicly sanctioned separation of the
races, thus reinforcing a perceived stigma of inferiority that impeded
the integration of the new black citizens into American society contrary
to the design of the Civil War Amendments. "We boast of the freedom
enjoyed by our people above all other peoples,"1 30 Harlan wrote. "But
it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practi-
cally, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of
our fellow-citizens, our equals before the law. The thin disguise of
'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not
mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done."''
The "separate but equal" rule wreaked its chief havoc in the consti-
tutional support that it lent to segregated education, especially in the
schools. In a few cases the Supreme Court held that separate educa-
tional facilities and transportation were unconstitutional because they
were not in fact "equal."' 32 It was not until 1954 that the Court repudi-
128. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
129. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
130. 163 U.S. at 562.
131. Id.
132. Most of these cases were discussed in Brown. However, for a full discussion of all the
more recent cases between Plessy and Brown see V. ROSENBLUM, LAW As A POLITICIAL INSTRU-
MENT 41-69 (1955).
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ated the "separate" doctrine as to public education. In 1954 it finally
agreed, unanimously, in Brown v. Board of Education 33 that
"[sleparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," and thus vio-
late "the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the [f]ourteenth
[a]mendment."'' 34 The Brown opinion seemed to argue that, in educa-
tion, the perception of the stigma of separation by young black students
made equal education psychologicaly impossible. The point was later
suggested that the psychological data relied on in Brown was not con-
vincing, and that the conclusions drawn from the data by the Court
were inaccurate. 135  Despite its grounding Brown in psychological
rather than moral language, the Court soon ruled out enforced segrega-
tion in all public facilities regardless of whether the "separate" facilities
were equal.' 36 Without saying so as a Court, by this series of cases the
United States Supreme Court in fact and law accepted Justice Harlan's
prophetic dissent in Plessy. After a long delay in implementing Brown,
the Court remained unanimous through its 1971 Swann'37 decision; it
oversaw reorganization of school districts in south and north with a
view of wiping out "root and branch," the dual system of racially segre-
gated schools. In Swann the Court upheld busing of black and white
children as a means of remedying the effects of unlawful segregation.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Swann recalls the mindfulness of the
original cases, and of Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent, that the design of
the equal protection clause required remedial steps "in order to lessen
the impact . . . of the state-imposed stigma of segregation."1 38
The school segregation cases are the beginning and not the end of the
inquiry into developments of what may be called the Brown era of in-
terpretation of the Civil War Amendments. The years since Brown-at
least until the 1978 Bakke 139 case-have seen an expanded hospitality
to claims by blacks of racial discrimination, through the thirteenth and
fifteenth amendments, and through the equal protection, due process
and enforcement clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Before dealing
with these matters it is time to review the use made by the Court of the
equal protection clause in non-racial cases in the pre-Brown period,
and the methodology (formulas, tests, and standards for decision of
equal protection cases) that the Court developed as envelopes for its
policy decisions.
133. 347 US. 483 (1954).
134. Id. at 495.
135. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 150 (1955).
136. See, e.g., the following cases which were decided by per curiam orders simply citing
Brown. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); Gayle v. Browder, 352
U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Altanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses).
137. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
138. Id. at 26.
139. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Recall the theme discussed in connection with Slaughter-House, Ex
Parte Virginia and Strauder, the "original" Civil War Amendment
cases, that "[tihe existence of laws in the states where the newly eman-
cipated [Niegroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied" 4 by the
equal protection clause. There was no question that equal protection
also protected others against discrimination. Protection was given
laundrymen of Chinese origin in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 4' in 1886. How-
ever, little use was made of the equal protection clause by the Court.
Plaintiff challenged a sterilization statute on both due process and
equal protection grounds in Buck v. Bell'4 2 in 1927. Justice Holmes
attended with some care to the due process argument before rejecting
it. But for the equal protection argument Holmes had little time, call-
ing it "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments."' 43 When the
Supreme Court did give attention to equal protection arguments it sim-
ply asked if there was a reasonable basis upon which the legislature
might have fashioned the challenged classification. This was the so-
called "rational basis" test. There were broader and narrower ways in
which the Court might measure this "rational basis'" but, under
equal protection the Court used an extremely light review of the gov-
ernmental action. This remained true even in the heyday of substan-
tive due process (1897-1937) when, as we have seen, the Supreme Court
freely struck down economic and social legislation as violations of due
process. Judicial reluctance to use the equal protection clause to find
constitutional violations in economic matters continued, as would be
expected, during the post-1937 days of the Roosevelt Court and its suc-
cessors.
In a celebrated footnote in the Carolene Products'4 5 case in 1938,
Justice Stone suggested that the Court might more carefully scrutinize
legislative classifications where "fundamental rights" were involved,
particularly those rights which impinged on the exercise of the demo-
cratic process (such as first amendment communications and voting), or
where the classification bore heavily upon a "discrete and insular mi-
nority" (such as, presumably, the long belabored blacks). In two such
cases during this period, the Court made initial moves to carve out a
stricter measure of testing governmental action under the equal protec-
tion clause, when personal liberty, rather than property, underlay
plaintiff's claim of right.
140. See text accompanying notes 108-22 supra.
141. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
142. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
143. Id. at 208.
144. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U.S. 106 (1949).
145. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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Skinner v. Oklahoma'4 6 in 1942 involved, like Buck v. Bell, 147 a state
sterilization statute. It was limited to criminals convicted of a felony.
Petitioner had been convicted of larceny, a felony that was defined
much like embezzlement, a non-felony that was not subject to steriliza-
tion. Justice Douglas, for the Court, pointed out that the sterilization
law impinged on one of the "basic rights of man," the right to procreate
and have a family. In this context, the Court would subject the statute
to "strict scrutiny," and not approve it merely because it had a "ra-
tional basis."' 148 Two years later in Korematsu v. United States,149 the
Court passed on the constitutionality of a military order in World War
II confining all persons of Japanese ancestry, citizens and noncitizens
alike, in prescribed military areas in California. In a severely criticized
decision, the Court affirmed the conviction against a claim that it was
an invidious racial discrimination. Justice Black, speaking for a six-to-
three Court, affirmed the constitutionality of the military order in one
of the most restrictive decisions on personal liberty in the nation's his-
tory. Black, one of the Court's most foremost libertarians, endeavored
to label this decision as one on the war power, and not a racial decision.
Of chief interest to us here, Black took the lead from Skinner and ex-
tended the "strict scrutiny" formula to situations of race:
All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restric-
tions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to
the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes jus-
tify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonisms never can. 15
0
However, there was, he said, necessity here. In 1948 in Oyama v. Cali-
fornia,'5 ' the Court held it a violation of equal protection for Califor-
nia to apply its Alien Land Law to Oyama, an American citizen,
insofar as its provisions discriminated against him on the basis of his
parents' country of origin. "There is absent the compelling justification
which would be needed to sustain discrimination of that nature."'' 52
These cases gave a start to the notion that race was a "suspect class"
that needed "compelling justification" to withstand an equal protection
challenge. The race-as-a-suspect class category only became firm with
three Brown era cases of the 1960's involving alleged discrimination
against blacks.' 53
146. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
147. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
148. 316 U.S. at 541.
149. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
150. Id. at 216.
151. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
152. Id. at 640.
153. See text accompanying notes 154-62 infra.
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In McLaughlin v. Florida'54 in 1964, the Supreme Court invalidated,
on equal protection grounds, a statute making racial cohabitation a dis-
tinct offense. The Court rejected the argument that equal protection is
satisfied as long as white and black participants in the offense are simi-
larly punished. In the same year, in Anderson v. Martin,'55 the Court
declared unconstitutional a state statute requiring that the race of every
candidate for elective office be placed on the ballot. "[P]lacing of the
power of the State behind a racial classification induces racial prejudice
at the polls.' 15 6 Three years later, in Loving v. Virginia,157 the Court
struck down a Virginia statute framed to prevent interracial marriages.
Relying on McLaughlin, the Court said, "There can be no doubt that
restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications
violates the central meaning of the [e]qual [pirotection [c]lause."' 58
(The Court found an additional ground of invalidity in the Skinner
suggestion of strict scrutiny where basic human rights were involved).
The Court's basic design in overturning the Virginia statute in Loving,
as in the desegregation cases, was that the statute was plainly written to
perpetuate the stigma of inferiority. While the Court did not hold that
racial classifications were always unconstitutional:
At the very least, the [e]qual [p]rotection clause demands that racial
classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to
the most rigid scrutiny, (citation omitted) and, if they are ever to be
upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of
some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimina-
tion which it was the object of the [f]ourteenth [ajmendment to elimi-
nate. 1
59
The Court concluded that "there is patently no legitimate overriding
purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies
this classification"'' 6' against mixed racial marriages. It was simply a
measure "designed to maintain White Supremacy"' 16' and perpetuate
the stigma of inferiority. Like Brown, then, these decisions in racial
classification cases were tied to "[t]he clear and central purpose of the
[f]ourteenth [a]mendment . . .to eliminate all official state sources of
invidious racial discrimination in the States."''
62
The previously inert equal protection clause, enforced by only the
light "rational basis" review, thus took on new significance in these
areas of basic human rights-expanded to include political rights, nota-
154. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
155. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
156. Id. it 402.
157. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
158. Id. at 12.
159. Id. at 11.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 10.
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bly voting, and the "suspect" racial classification. In these two areas
the Court more strictly examined the state legislation to see if (1) it
achieved its designed purpose; and (2) more significantly, whether there
was a special governmental interest which would justify state legisla-
tion hostile to these interests. The formula used by the Court whether
entitled "compelling state interest," "subordinating state interest," or
some comparable formula, was designed to require a very heavy show-
ing of governmental necessity which could not be vindicated by less
drastic, nonracial means.
Attempts have been made to expand the category of "suspect" classi-
fications beyond race. Since 1971, alienage has enjoyed a brief career,
progressively diminished in scope, as a "suspect classification" trigger-
ing the "compelling state interest" test. 163 Other attempts were made to
secure recognition by the Court of poverty,"6 illegitimacy, 1
65 and sex 16 6
(or gender) as entitled to this more exacting standard of judicial review.
These have been rebuffed and in such a way as to support the view that
the Court was mindful of the special significance accorded racial dis-
crimination and stigma in the original design of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, as recognized in the original deci-
sions (Slaughter-House, etc.) and confirmed in the Brown era cases we
have discussed. The manner in which the Court declined to make clas-
sifications based on wealth/poverty a "suspect" classification gives
weight to this inference. In Hunter v. Erickson167 in 1969, the Court
held that equal protection had been violated by Akron's amendment of
its city charter to prevent the city council from implementing any ordi-
nance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in
housing, until it had been specifically approved by the electorate. The
Court ruled that the Akron amendment denied a black citizen equal
protection because it treated "racial housing matters differently than
other racial and housing matters."' 168 In 1971 in James v. Valtierra,169
the Court was called to pass on a California constitutional requirement
for local legislative bodies to submit low-rent public housing decisions
to a special community election. Low-cost housing clients claimed that
163. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the court held that a classification based
solely on alienage was "suspect." This decision has been considerably limited by the Court as to
the federal government by virtue of Congress' power over immigration and naturalization. See,
e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (public employment); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 69 (1976) (federal Medicare benefits). It has been limited as to state employees in light of
state interest over "basic functions of government." Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (state
police officer); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (public school teacher).
164. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
165. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
166. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
167. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
168. Id. at 389.
169. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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they had been singled out because of their poverty and therefore that
they had been denied equal protection. The district court relied on
Hunter, and granted plaintiff's relief. The Supreme Court reversed,
and explained:
The present case could be affirmed only by extending Hunter, and this
we decline to do .... Hunter rested on the conclusion that Akron's
referendum law denied 'equal protection' by placing 'special burdens
on racial minorities within the governmental process.' Unlike the Ak-
ron referendum position, it cannot be said that California's Article
XXXIV rests on 'distinctions based on race'....t70
This rejection of wealth/poverty as a "suspect" classification was con-
firmed in 1973 in the leading case of San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,t7 1 in which the Supreme Court packaged its cele-
brated two-tier formula for equal protection review. If the state classi-
fication burdened a "fundamental right" which had been identified as
such by the Court, or if it involved a "suspect classification," there
would be "strict scrutiny" and the need of showing a "compelling gov-
ernmental interest." Otherwise an equal protection challenge would be
given only the limited "rational basis" review. In Rodriguez plaintiffs
challenged Texas' financing arrangements for education, charging that
in wealthier areas more state funds were expended for public education
than in poorer areas. The Court denied both that wealth/poverty con-
stituted a "suspect" classification (James), and that education was a
"fundamental right" (despite its extravagant endorsement of the impor-
tance of education in the racial context of Brown). Accordingly, the
Court applied the "rational basis" limited review, and found that
Texas' financing scheme passed muster under the equal protection
clause.
Claims for "suspect classifications" based solely on illegitimacy,'72
and on sex or gender, 7 3 were likewise rejected by the Court. However,
some scholars have made a good case that while the Court does not use
"strict scrutiny" in sex and illegitimacy cases, it uses more than a light
"rational basis" review.' 7 4 In its latest formulation of the standard of
reviewing alleged sex discrimination in Craig v. Boren,' the Court re-
quired that the challenged legislation bear a "fair and substantial rela-
170. Id. at 140-41.
171. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
172. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). In United States v. Clark, 48
U.S.L.W. 4195, 4196 (1980) a Court majority restated the illegitimacy standard: "[A] classification
based on illegitimacy is unconstitutional unless it bears 'an evident and substantial relation to the
particular . . . interests [a] statute is designed to serve.'"
173. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
174. See Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court.- A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 663 (9th ed. 1975).
175. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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tion to an important governmental interest."' 76 Despite its evident care
in inspecting legislation that makes sex or illegitimacy the basis for re-
ceipt or denial of governmental benefits, the Court has not been willing
to interpret the fourteenth amendment's regard for sex and illegitimates
with the same degree of scrutiny required by its central concern for
race, or for the "fundamental rights" which, we have seen, 7 7 the Court
has itself elicited from the term due process, and those it has specially
identified as subject to the strictest protection of the equal protection
clause. 171
A. Other Brown Era Illustrations
The position I have been developing is that in what we may call the
Brown era, signifying the period commencing in 1954, the Supreme
Court has reverted to the contemporaneous view of Slaughter-House
that the Civil War Amendments were principally directed to erasure of
slavery and its effects. We have just noted this in the context of a new
"strict scrutiny" applied to governmental classifications based on race.
It may also be seen in Warren and Burger Court cases dealing with the
thirteenth amendment abolishing slavery, and with the fifteenth
amendment banning racial discrimination affecting voting rights. In
addition, greater protection has been given rights against racial dis-
crimination in areas of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence that we
have not yet considered, notably the extension of congressional power
in race cases under section 5, and the greater scope of equal protection
accorded voting rights when racial factors are in issue. I now turn to
these matters.
1. Resurgence of the Thirteenth Amendment-Jones v. Mayer179
The thirteenth amendment, enacted in 1865, deals explicitly with
race, and only race. Its effectiveness had been greatly restricted by the
Civil Rights Cases 8' and Plessy v. Ferguson81 which denied that Con-
gress might legislate under that amendment to erase "badges of slav-
ery," such as racial discrimination. In 1866 Congress legislated to ban
racial discrimination in all property and contract transactions. After
the enactment of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, the provisions of
the 1866 Act were re-enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1870.
176. Id. at 197.
177. See text accompanying notes 96-100 supra.
178. Certain rights have been specially designated as "fundamental" under the equal protec-
tion clause, notably those dealing with access to the ballot, access to the courts, and the right to
travel.
179. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
180. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
181. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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After the Civil Rights Cases specified that the prohibitions of the four-
teenth amendment applied only to state action, it had been assumed
that the property (42 U.S.C. § 1982) and contract (42 U.S.C. § 1981)
provisions of the Civil Rights Acts must also be restricted to govern-
mental (and not private) discriminations. One Mr. Jones sued Mayer
Co., charging that Mayer's failure to rent Jones a house because he was
black constituted a violation of section 1982 which entitled Jones to
recover damages. Mayer Co. answered that 1) section 1982 must be
considered as re-enacted by Congress in 1870 pursuant to section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment; 2) that being the case it was constitutionally
applicable only to governmental (not private) discrimination. This
seemed an impeccable argument under the Supreme Court's decisions
in and following the Civil Rights Cases of 1883. However, in Jones v.
Mayer, 82 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, ef-
fected a massive change in its prior rules. First, it construed 1866 to be
the operative date of section 1982. It looked to the date of its original
enactment as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,183 passed under Con-
gress' enforcement authority in section 2 of the thirteenth amendment,
rather than to 1870, the date of re-enactment under the fourteenth.
Second, and of critical importance, the Court disavowed those parts of
the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy that had denied that the range of the
thirteenth amendment included "badges of slavery," such as racial dis-
crimination. Justice Stewart's discrediting of the Court's position of
eighty-five years is an especially significant indication of the Court's
return to its "original position" (of Slaughter-House) because Mr.
Jones' and other comparable problems would have been adequately re-
solved under the just-passed Civil Rights Act of 1968, 14 which allowed
recovery of damages against individuals for discrimination in housing.
It was abundantly clear that the Court would hold this 1968 Act consti-
tutional-not under the fourteenth amendment, but under Congress'
power to enact legislation that would bind private individuals under its
power to regulate interstate commerce. In Jones v. Mayer'85 Justice
Stewart for the Court minced no words in holding that section 1982
and the thirteenth amendment were enacted to eliminate restraints on
"those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom":
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free
exercise of those rights, were substitutes for the slave system, so the
exclusion of Negroes from white communities became a substitute for
the Black Codes. And when racial discrimination herds men into ghet-
tos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their
182. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
183. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
184. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 42 U.S.C.).
185. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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skin, then it too is a relic of slavery . .186
2. Ffteenth Amendment and Racial Voting Rights
The unanimous 1966 decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach'8 7 up-
held an Act to remedy alleged efforts to prevent or discourage blacks
from voting in the southern states. The Supreme Court, in upholding
the extensive reach of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,188 rested its deci-
sion on section 2, the enforcement clause, of the fifteenth amendment.
However, in giving broad power to Congress under the enforcement
clause, the Court returned to one of its early decisions. To section 2 of
the fifteenth amendment, the Court applied language it had used to
explain section 5 of the fourteenth amendment in the 1880 case of Ex
Parte Virginia189 : "By adding [section 2 of the fifteenth amendment]
the Framers indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for
implementing the rights created in [section] 1." 9 Then the Court
quoted from Ex Parte Virginia: It is the power of Congress which has
been enlarged. Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by
appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the
[Civil War] amendments fully effective.' 9 ' The Court's tone was far
from its hostility to racial aspirations in the Civil Rights Cases and
Plessy. This becomes even more evident when the Court identifies "the
basic test to be applied in a case involving [section] 2 of the [f]ifteenth
[a]mendment":
Chief Justice Marshall laid down the classic formulation, [fifty] years
before the [flifteenth [a]mendment was ratified: 'Let the end be legiti-
mate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional. ' 92
The Court added that this test of Marshall had been specifically
adopted by the Court as the measure of enforcement clauses of the
Civil War Amendments in Ex Parte Virginia, one of our original cases.
There was no reference to the narrower hospitality it had allowed sec-
tion 5 in the Civil Rights Cases.
A further comparison favorable to racial rights in the context of the
fifteenth amendment may be seen in the manner in which the Court
approached the implications for "voting rights" when impinged upon
186. Id. at 441-43.
187. 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (Justice Black did dissent from a portion of the Court's opinion that
does not bear on the present discussion).
188. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973).
189. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
190. 383 U.S. at 326.
191. 383 U.S. at 325-26.
192. Id. at 326, quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
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by state political manipulation of voting districts, a practice known as
"gerrymandering." Despite the broad protection given to voting rights
as "fundamental rights" under the fourteenth amendment, the Court
had refused in 1976 to find an infringement of voting rights in mere
political gerrymandering. 93 However, in a case early in the Brown era
it found a fifteenth amendment violation when the "gerrymandering"
of districts was motivated by racial rather than Democrat/Republican
partisanship.'94 Also relevant here is an aspect of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act' 9 5 (section 5) which may require reorganization of election
districts to correct racial imbalances. This feature, upheld by the Court
against both statutory and equal protection challenges in United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey19 6 in 1977, will be discussed more fully below.
3. Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 and Voting Rights
Other aspects of recent fourteenth amendment decisions by the
Court have significance for the point we have been urging: the Brown
era Supreme Court has found a basis in the fourteenth amendment to
give greater protection against discrimination based on race. There is
no question that the thirteenth and the fifteenth amendments have no
relevance outside of race. Our review with respect to them has shown
only that the Brown era Court has labored to remove obstacles the ear-
lier Court had interposed to making these amendments effective. How-
ever, when we come to the fourteenth amendment, we find the Court
continually puzzled by two opposing thrusts-the central core of this
amendment (like the thirteenth and fifteenth) is the integration of the
former slave race in the American policy and society, and yet the four-
teenth amendment is applicable by its terms to "any person." The
Brown era Court has been convinced that from 1883-1954 its predeces-
sors had virtually ignored the primary racial thrust- and at tremen-
dous cost not only to the black citizens, but to the whole racially
divided American society. It sought to reinstate what it conceived as
the original intent of the framers of the Civil War Amendments and the
nation which adopted them, as elaborated in Slaughter-House. On the
other hand, this same Court became responsible, as we have seen,19 7 for
the greatest explosion of individual rights of "any person" in the long
history of the Supreme Court.
B. Enforcement Power under the Fourteenth Amendment
Despite the broad language of Ex Parte Virginia with respect to the
193. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
194. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
195. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973).
196. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
197. See text accompanying notes 96-100 supra.
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enforcement power of Congress under the Civil War Amendments,
Congress' enforcement power under section 5 became essentially a
dead letter following the Civil Rights Cases. It appeared to receive a lift
in the language we have seen from a fifteenth amendment case, South
Carolina v. Katzenbach.198 In Katzenbach v. Morgan,99 however, the
question that reached the Court was Congress' power to enact require-
ments under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to meet the stan-
dard of equal protection. Without much preliminary study, Congress
enacted an amendment to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that prohib-
ited the enforcement of a literacy test in New York to restrict Puerto
Rican citizens of New York from voting. In Morgan in 1966, the Court
upheld the Congressional action as within its power under section 5 to
enforce the equal protection clause, even though the Supreme Court
itself had recently upheld a comparable state literacy test against an
equal protection challenge. In support of its view the Court cited the
same "enforcement" language from Ex Parte Virginia, and the same
Marshall test from McCulloch v. Maryland 2  that we just saw in the
fifteenth amendment South Carolina v. Katzenbach2°' decision.
Encouraged by what it perceived as the Court's revival of Congres-
sional power to enforce the fourteenth amendment, in 1969 Congress
enacted a statute that purported to give eighteen-year olds the right to
vote, not only in national elections, but also (using section 5) in state
elections. In 1970, by a five to four vote in Oregon v. Mitchell,2 °2 the
Court upheld the national election provision. However, the Court, by
the same margin, denied that Congress' power under section 5 author-
ized it to provide for eighteen-year old voting in state elections. Con-
gress, as in Morgan, purported to be enforcing the equal protection
clause. Justice Black (casting the deciding vote) denied the applicabil-
ity of the Morgan precedent because the Act upheld in Morgan in-
volved rectification of a racial discrimination (not one based on age):
"Where Congress attempts to remedy racial discrimination under its
enforcement powers, its authority is enhanced by the avowed intention
of the framers of the [t]hirteenth, [f]ourteenth, and [flifteenth
[a]mendments."2 3 While the authority of this sentence is diminished
by the fact that Justice Black was speaking for himself and not for a
majority of the Court (Black had been in the majority on both the state
and the national voting questions), the result in Oregon v. Mitchell2°
remains the controlling pronouncement of the Court with respect to the
198. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
199. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
200. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
201. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
202. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
203. Id. at 129.
204. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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diverse threads of Congress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, and it is a fair illustration of the preferred place that the
Brown era Court has given to race in the fourteenth amendment
scheme.
One of the post-Civil War civil rights statutes (codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3)205) provided remedies for conspiracies to deprive "any person
or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privi-
leges and immunities under the laws. ' ' ° In 1951 in Collins v. Hardy-
man, °7 members of a political club sought damages under this statute
against American Legionnaires who had allegedly conspired to break
up their meeting, held in opposition to the Marshall Plan for foreign
aid. In affirming dismissal of the action, the Supreme Court limited
the reach of section 1985(3) to those private conspiracies that domi-
nated or displaced state governments. In fact, said the Court, if this
complaint did state a claim that met "the requirements of this Act, it
raised constitutional problems of the first magnitude. ' 20 8 The Court
assumed that this Act of April 20, 1871, was subject to the requirement
of "state action" imposed by the Civil Rights Cases, and that congres-
sional action under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment was limited
by those cases to remedying defects resulting from state involvement in
the conspiracy, and did not reach ordinary private conspiracies.
In 1971, in Griffin v. Breckinridge,2°9 plaintiffs were black citizens of
Mississippi who alleged that defendants, white Mississippians, had on
racial grounds privately conspired to deprive them of equal protection,
in violation of section 1985(3), and they sought damages. The lower
courts dismissed the action on the authority of Collins v. Hardyman. ,
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, found constitu-
tional ground upon which to support an action against private persons
(as in Jones v. Mayer2 1 ) in the thirteenth amendment, and also in the
"fundamental right" to travel, which had been variously rooted in the
fourteenth amendment and non-fourteenth amendment sources. The
Court, however, put a curious caveat upon its now enlarged interpreta-
tion of this statute, which was clearly phrased in the terminology of the
fourteenth amendment: "equal protection of the laws or of equal privi-
leges and immunities under the laws."1 2 The Court was determined to
reach its result without setting a precedent that would make section
1985(3) an anchor point for the development of an open-ended federal
205. The statute is presently designated 42 U.S.C. 1985(c).
206. Id.
207. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
208. Id. at 659.
209. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
210. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
211. See text accompanying note 182 supra.
212. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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law for vindicating personal injuries. Justice Stewart specified that "the
language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privi-
leges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action."2 3 The Court highlighted its preoccupation with
the race factor by adding, "We need not decide, given the facts of this
case, whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory in-
tent other than racial bias would be actionable under the portion of
section 1985(3) before us."2 ' Although it has had opportunity to do so,
the Court has not, to date, expanded its interpretation of this statute to
reach a non-racial conspiracy. Even though Grin was a case of statu-
tory interpretation, and not a direct construction of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, it is a fair illustration of the
Court's recurrent recognition of expanded Congressional power under
section 5 where race is its design rather than otherwise.
C. Equal Protection and Voting Rights
When Chief Justice Warren was asked to name the most significant
decision during his time on the Supreme Court he surprised his interro-
gator by naming not Brown v. Board of Education,2"' but Baker v.
Carr,2 16 the 1963 case which led to federal courts' overseeing the ap-
portionment of state electoral districts. Baker challenged Tennessee of-
ficials, claiming that the legislative establishment in 1898 of units for
electing state legislators was hopelessly out of date and made his vote
worth just a fraction of that of voters in smaller units. For example,
assume there are fifty legislative districts for electing fifty members of
the legislature in a state with 5,000,000 in population. If twenty of
these districts each contain 200,000 population and the other thirty dis-
tricts have 33,333 each, a voter in the smaller districts obviously has
more voting power. The Court held that Baker had been denied equal
protection to the extent that his voting power had been diluted. How
should his voting power be brought up to par? In the above example
absolute equality among voters would have required fifty districts of
100,000 each. This is the standard that the Court established in later
cases.2 17 The districts should be apportioned so as to give "one person,
one vote." This voting rights explosion brought an expansion of the
general coverage of the equal protection clause, and was not linked to
racial concerns. However, when the Court came to consider the prob-
213. 403 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 102 n.9.
215. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
216. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
217. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1963).
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lem of multimember districts, it recognized once again the special sig-
nificance of racial factors under the equal protection clause.
After the one-person-one-vote standard had been established, the re-
apportionment cases were mainly concerned with the percentage of
permissible deviation from the norm of equality. Ultimately the ques-
tion arose as to the permissibility of multimember districts. Assume
geographical area X is entitled to elect five representatives in the state
legislature. Overall in X, group A has sixty percent voter support and
group B has forty percent. Assume most of group B's voters reside in
two of the five particular districts of X. If election is by districts, one
would expect A to elect three members and B to elect two. But if the
five members are elected at-large in X, as a multimember district, A,
the majority group, will probably elect all five. When the Supreme
Court was asked in 1971 to declare multimember districts an automatic
violation of equal protection it declined.218 But it inserted an "unless"
clause that would later prove crucial: unless the multimember scheme
"would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial
or political elements of the .voting population." '2 19 The caution con-
cerning "political" elements left open whether the Court might later set
aside general political gerrymandering. The Court has declined to step
in here. But multimember districts which would impinge on "the vot-
ing strength of racial"22 elements proved something else. After ini-
tially declining to intervene when a black voter challenged a
multimember district on that ground, the Court in White v. Regester, 221
1973 case, unanimously struck down multimember districts in Texas.
It was enough for the Court that there were findings that in one county
the black community had been effectively excluded from participation
in the Democratic primary selection process, 2 2 2 and that in another
county Mexican-Americans had been excluded from effective partici-
pation in political life. The Court's opinion relied heavily on the back-
ground of "history of official racial discrimination in Texas .. "223
In this line of fourteenth amendment cases then, the Brown era
Court once again responded more readily to alleged discrimination
grounded in racial exclusion than to complaints relying on nonracial
grounds.
218. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
219. Id. at 143 (emphasis added). See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965); Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
220. 403 U.S. at 143.
221. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
222. Id. at 767.
223. Id. at 765-68. In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48 U.S.L.W. 4436 (1980) the Court limited
White Y. Regester to cases in which there was a showing of intentional racial discrimination,
whether the objection to multimember districts be challenged under the fourteenth or fifteenth
amendments. But see City of Rome v. United States, 48 U.S.L.W. 4463 (1980).
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D. Intent and "Stigma" in Equal Protection Race Cases
In the 1960's Congress, like the Court, addressed the urgent problem
of a racially divided society in which the descendants of the new black
citizens of post-Civil War days were still laboring under the burdens of
racial discrimination. We have already noted224 two of these Acts, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Civil Rights (Housing) Act of 1968.
The centerpiece of the legislative effort so far as discrimination is con-
cerned was the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This Act attempted to by-pass
the long-standing barrier of the Civil Rights Cases to legislation pursu-
ant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment directed against private
discrimination. It did so by resting the Act on Congress' power under
the commerce clause, which had been given wide scope by the
Roosevelt Court and its successors. The Court promptly sustained the
public facilities section (Title II) of the 1964 Act on this commerce
ground in two 1964 cases.225 Another feature of the 1964 Act (Title
VII) set up an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, with a
body of law outlawing discrimination in employment on grounds of
race, religion, nationality, and sex. In a decisive series of cases, 226 the
Supreme Court interpreted this Congressional mandate as constitution-
ally reaching employment situations in which employment policies that
were neutral on the surface, such as educational requirements and
plant seniority provisions, had a disproportionate racially (or sexually)
discriminatory impact. Another section of the Act (Title VI) banned
discrimination on any of these grounds in programs to which federal
funds had been contributed. Although Title VI was upheld as constitu-
tional by the Court227 it had, until Bakke, received little attention by
the Supreme Court. Side by side with these possible statutory viola-
tions remained the possibility that a racial discrimination might be
found in violation of the Constitution, under the strict equal protection
clause doctrine invoking race as a "suspect clasification" already dis-
cussed. Curiously, until 1976 the Supreme Court had not directly228
considered whether an intentional discrimination was required to con-
stitute a violation of equal protection. In that year the Court answered
this question in Washington v. Davis.229
In Davis unsuccessful black applicants for training as police officers
in the District of Columbia Police Department contended that the test
224. See text accompanying notes 184-88 supra.
225. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
226. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971).
227. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1964).
228. But in school desegregation cases the Court had distinguished between de jure segrega-
tion (intentional) and defacto segregation (unintentional).
229. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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given applicants for entry into the training program was a racially-bi-
ased violation of equal protection. The test was a general Civil Service
Commission examination administered throughout the government to
measure verbal aptitude, and the plaintiffs did not allege that it was
discriminatory in intent. The district court denied the plaintiffs relief,
but the court of appeals reversed, finding that the test violated both the
equal protection clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on both constitu-
tional and statutory grounds.
The court of appeals, counsel on both sides, and the several amici
curiae assumed, without discussion or argument, that the equal protec-
tion standard was identical to the disproportionate impact standard of
Title VII. Justice White's opinion for six members of a seven to one
Court pointed out that this assumption was wrong. A disproportionate
racial impact was insufficient to ground an equal protection violation.
There must be shown an intent to discriminate. Even the dissenters,
Justice Brennan and Marshall, who disagreed with the Court's statu-
tory conclusion and found a violation under Title VII, and Justice Ste-
vens, concurring, expressed no disagreement with the Court's insistence
that a showing of discriminatory purpose was an ingredient of an equal
protection violation. The Court conceded that "an invidious discrimi-
natory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts, including the fact . . . that the law bears more heavily on one
race than another. '2 3' However, Justice White's opinion insisted, "dis-
proportionate impact . . . standing alone" does not "trigger the ['strict-
est scrutiny'] rule," according to which challenged governmental action
is made "justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations. '"231
The question of what was an invidious racial purpose and whether
this purpose was supplied whenever a legislature, for example, deliber-
ately used race in a purposeful manner remained unanswered until
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey.232 The
Court once again considered statutory and equal protection constitu-
tional grounds for challenged legislation. In United Jewish Organiza-
tions, New York State had sought to satisfy the Attorney General of
the United States that its planned redistricting complied with section 5
of the Voting Acts of 1965, as amended in 1970. New York was subject
to the provisions of that statute because of having used a "discrimina-
tory test or device" in counties where fewer than fifty percent had
voted. So when New York wished to change its voting arrangements, it
had to secure approval either from the district court of the District of
230. Id at 242.
231. Id.
232. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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Columbia or from the Attorney General. New York took the latter
route.
Apparently to satisfy the Attorney General's requirements under sec-
tion 5, the state used racial criteria to establish substantial non-white
majorities in two assembly districts and two senate districts. To
achieve a desired sixty five percent of minority (black and Hispanic-
American) voters in these districts, the state's 1974 redistricting legisla-
tion split a closely-knit community of 30,000 Hasidic Jews (who previ-
ously voted together in one senate district and one assembly district)
into two senate and two assembly districts. With its voting power thus
divided, the Hasidic community allegedly lost its previous capability to
elect the one assemblyman and one senator. Members of the Jewish
community sought a court judgment that the legislation "would dilute
the value of each plaintiffs franchise by halving its effectiveness solely
for the purpose of achieving a racial quota and therefore [was] in viola-
tion of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment." '233 The district court denied re-
lief, and the Supreme Court affirmed in a seven to one decision in
which Justice Marshall did not participate.
The Supreme Court considered both constitutional and statutory ba-
ses for the challenged legislation. A majority of the Court sustained the
legislation against the equal protection challenge. They did not con-
sider any support derived from the statute. However, only four Justices
agreed with the portion of Justice White's opinion that upheld the New
York statute on grounds of special power derived from the Voting
Rights Act. The White opinion as to the equal protection issue, in
which Justices Rehnquist and Stevens joined, recognized that "the
State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner" 234 in its redistrict-
ing plan. The opinion then distinguished between "purposeful" use of
a racial criterion and what the opinion called "discriminatory pur-
pose." Since the state's plan "represented no racial slur or stigma with
respect to white or any other race . ..we discern no discrimination
violative of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment. 235 Justices Stewart and
Powell indicated agreement with these equal protection views in a sep-
arate concurrence:
Under the [flourteenth [a]mendment the question is whether the reap-
portionment plan represents purposeful discrimination against white
voters. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). ... That the legis-
lature was aware of race when it drew the district lines might also sug-
gest a discriminatory purpose. Such awareness is not, however, the
equivalent of discriminatory intent. The clear purpose with which the
New York Legislature acted ...forecloses any finding that it acted
233. Id. at 152-53.
234. Id. at 165.
235. Id.
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with the invidious purpose of discriminating against white voters. 236
From Washington v. Davis,23 and cases following it,2 38 it was clear
that for a racial discrimination under the equal protection clause a dis-
criminatory purpose was required. From United Jewish Organizations
it seemed clear that not every intentional use of race constituted the
required "invidious" "discriminatory purpose." Three Justices at least
(White, Rehnquist, and Stevens) identified this "discriminatory pur-
pose" with a "racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other
race." 239 While the other Justices in the majority (Stewart and Powell)
did not use this phrase in their concurrence, it is hard to discern what
else they may have had in mind when they found no "invidious pur-
pose of discriminating." Court watchers thought there might be signifi-
cance in the fact that United Jewish Organizations was decided just one
week after the grant of certiorari by the Court in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke,2" ° in which a white plaintiff alleged racial
discrimination based on equal protection when a state medical school
denied his admission at the same time that it reserved 16 of 100 seats
for blacks and other minorities in its preferential admissions.
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: BAKKE AND WEBER
Regents of the University of Calfornia v. Bakke24 was to have been
the most significant constitutional decision in the race area since
Brown. It might have been. But, it seems after all, that it was not.
Five members of a hopelessly divided Court directed that the medical
school of the University of California at Davis admit Allan Bakke to its
entering class, holding its preferential admissions program illegal. On
the other hand, five members of the same Court can be added up for
the proposition that race may, under certain (unspecified) circum-
stances be used as a factor in classification of admissions to medical
school, and presumably in classification of distribution of some other
governmental benefits.
The impact of the Bakke decision upon preferential admissions pro-
grams in medical schools and law schools seems to have been extensive.
There was fear that the obscurity of the Court's basis for its decision,
when finally given more light, might produce a retreat by the Court
from the constitutional green light it seemed, in the past, to have given
affirmative action programs in less exotic areas than professional edu-
236. Id. at 179-80.
237. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
238. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 232
(1977).
239. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977).
240. 429 U.S. 1090 (1977).
241. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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cation. The Weber24 opinion must be cautiously regarded because of
some very special facts. The Court's majority, adding Justice Stewart
to the dissenters in Bakke, now seems to consider itself still squarely
within the Brown era, rather than signaling its termination, as some
had feared a decision for Weber, and against the voluntary affirmative
action training program, would do. These cases call for our closest
scrutiny.
In the 1974 term the Supreme Court heard and decided a preferen-
tial admissions case, that of Mario DeFunis, who claimed that he had
been excluded from the State of Washington's university law school
because of its racial preferential minority admissions program. How-
ever, the Court's decision was simply not to decide. Since DeFunis was
in the last quarter of his final year at law school, the Court held, five to
four, that the case was moot and that there was no need to deal with the
difficult questions presented on the merits.
243
The preferential admissions question was presented to the Court
again three years later, and the Court granted the petition of the Re-
gents of the University of California to review the California Supreme
Court's decision that the University of California Medical School at
Davis had violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution in
denying Allan Bakke a seat, in favor of students with lower point aver-
ages who had been admitted to the 16 (out of 100) seats reserved for
disadvantaged minorities. Bakke's claim, like DeFunis' before him,
was that he was disadvantaged by a state's use of an explicit racial clas-
sification, and that this racial classification was either per se bad, or at
least required justification under the "strict scrutiny--compelling state
interest" test the United States Supreme Court had fashioned for "sus-
pect classification." In the California trial court Bakke secured a judg-
ment that the Medical School had violated both the equal protection
clause, and also Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which barred
discrimination in programs receiving federal funds. However, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court rested its affirmance solely on Bakke's equal
protection arguments. The briefs and arguments for both sides in the
United States Supreme Court concentrated on the equal protection ar-
gument.
In Bakke, as in DeFunis, the interested lawyers and courts alike
seemed convinced that the resolution of the equal protection issue
hinged on the methodology (test, formula) which the Supreme Court
would adopt as applicable. Was the "strict scrutiny-compelling state
interest" test which the Court had framed with a disadvantaged minor-
242. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
243. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). In the Washington court, the case was cited
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
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ity in mind also applicable to a white citizen claiming "reverse dis-
crimination"? Interestingly, both the Washington Supreme Court
which held against DeFunis, and the California Supreme Court which
upheld Bakke answered: "Yes." Whereas, the Washington Court went
on to find that the "compelling state interest" had been shown in
DeFunis, the California Supreme Court held that it had not been
demonstrated in Bakke.
What competing bases for decision were open to the Supreme Court
after receiving the briefs of the parties and of an unprecedented
number of amici curiae, and after hearing oral arguments in Bakke?
1. As did the Washington and California courts, the Supreme
Court might determine that the "strict scrutiny-compelling state inter-
est" test was applicable, and decide for or against Bakke depending on
whether it viewed the state interests in maintaining preferential racial
admissions as "compelling."
2. The Court might determine that, for some reason, the strict test
was not applicable, and limit its inquiry to ascertaining whether there
was a "rational basis" (light review test) for preferential racial admis-
sion.
3. Conceivably, although the "strict scrutiny test" was not applica-
ble, the Court might decide to apply a stricter test to preferential ad-
missions than the light "rational basis" test. The Court seems to have
taken this intermediate course in claims of equal protection violation
based on sex or illegitimacy. 2" The remaining inquiry would be,
again, whether the demands of the adopted test had been satisfied in
the case before the Court.
4. The Court might decline to reach the constitutional question at
all, by holding that the medical school's preferential admissions pro-
gram was in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
preventing racial (and other) discrimination in programs making use of
federal funds.
This last alternative was unlikely. The California Supreme Court's
opinion had rested solely on the fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion argument, and the parties had briefed only the equal protection
issue. Further it was not clear that Title VI gave a private party any
rights, or that the Title VI standard of "racial discrimination" was any-
thing different than under "equal protection." Nevertheless, on oral
argument, certain Justices showed interest in Title VI and the Court
directed the parties to brief the Title VI issue for the Court.
On which of these issues was Bakke decided? The hasty answer is:
Title VI. Four of the Justices took this position squarely (Stevens, Bur-
ger, Rehnquist, and Stewart). But the fifth Justice, whose vote was cru-
244. See text accompanying notes 172-76 supra.
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cial to sending Allan Bakke to Medical School, Justice Powell, was led
into discussion of the fourteenth amendment equal protection issue be-
cause, in his view, the scope of "racial discrimination" in Title VI was
identical to that of the equal protection clause. The only Justices who
discussed the equal protection issue as a bloc (Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun) would have upheld the racial preference pro-
gram. They were, however, in a minority-except as to one single
strand on which Powell agreed with them-that the fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection did not ban every use of race as a factor in ad-
missions. This narrow concession by Justice Powell was widely hailed
as saving for another day the fate of affirmative action programs
adopted in workplace situations.
The first decision by the Supreme Court explicitly on workplace af-
firmative action came in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,24 5
on June 27, 1979. However, this five to two decision of the Court (with
Justices Powell and Stevens not sitting) purports to answer the narrow-
est of questions: "whether Congress, in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended . . . left employers and unions . . . free to
take such race-conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances
in traditionally segregated job categories. '246 The Court's answer:
"We hold that Title VII does not prohibit such race-conscious affirma-
tive action plans. '2 47 The question remains, what do Bakke and
Weber, read together, lead us to expect as to equal protection?
The Court majority in Weber was made up of the Brennan Four
minority bloc in Bakke, plus Justice Stewart, who had escaped con-
fronting the equal protection issue in Bakke by adhering to the Title VI
position. The equal protection clause was not involved in Weber, sim-
ply because that clause would only reach a situation involving state
action, and in Weber there was merely a private contract between
union and management. In Weber Justice Stewart resumed his more
usual position, aligned with those who perceive the validity of the
Slaughter-House view of the Civil War Amendments. Arguably then,
any illumination Bakke may now give to equal protection law would
come from the Brennan Four's "minority" opinion in Bakke rather
than Justice Powell's opinion for himself alone. True, the Court may
eventually adopt the Powell Bakke opinion, rather than the Brennan
Four's; however, that possibility now seems unlikely.
A. Bakke
First we must consider the three key opinions in Bakke.
245. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
246. Id. at 197.
247. Id.
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The first opinion, Justice Stevens', included Justices Burger and
Rehnquist, in addition to himself and Stewart. It was this opinion, cou-
pled with Justice Powell's for himself-that sent Allan Bakke to Davis
Medical School. Unlike Justice Powell, this bloc rested squarely on
Title VI and found no reason to consider whether equal protection was
offended. "We need not decide the congruence-or lack of congru-
ence-of the controlling statute (Title VI) and the Constitution since
the meaning of the Title VI ban on exclusion is crystal clear: Race
cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from participation in a feder-
ally funded program." '248 Justice Powell felt that the meaning of "dis-
crimination" in Title VI was the same as the scope of "discrimination"
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. As we
shall see, his view of this scope was considerably narrower than that of
the Brennan Four. Only these five Justices uttered a line on the equal
protection clause in Bakke, and of those five the Brennan Four had
four votes to one. The question after Bakke was, and is, where will the
members of the Stevens Four line up when forced to face the equal
protection argument on affirmative action?
The second key opinion was that of the Brennan Four. Its equal
protection analysis, in terms of the questions we posed at the outset,
settled on formulating a new test. Davis Medical School's special mi-
nority admissions program did not use race in such a way as to trigger
the "strict scrutiny-compelling state interest" standard as a "suspect
classification." On the other hand, the burden of preferential admis-
sions on whites, such as Bakke, was sufficiently great to warrant more
than the light judicial review attributed to the "rational basis" stan-
dard. Courts should use a more strict standard, an intermediate one
such as the Court applies to classifications burdensome to women, or to
illegitimates. The Brennan Four denied that Title VI could resolve the
case. There was "one fixed purpose" of Title VI: "to give the Execu-
tive Branch of Government clear authority to terminate federal fund-
ing of private programs that use race as a means of disadvantaging
minorities in a manner that would be prohibited by the Constitution if
engaged in by government." '49 They agreed with Justice Powell, then,
that the standard of an offense against Title VI was the same as that of
an offense against equal protection. They disagreed with him (and with
the Stevens Four) that Title VI gave any right of action to an individual
in a private suit. So the Brennan Four, like Powell, faced the constitu-
tional question: What, if any, rights can Bakke derive from the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment? The following four
points outline their analysis:
248. 438 U.S. at 417.
249. Id. at 329.
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1. The use of race in a governmental classification was not always
(per se) bad. They cited the cases we have considered, and two others
in which a race classification was deliberately used in a school assign-
ment plan to combat segregation. A deliberate use of race might be
justified by some sort of "overriding statutory" purpose.
2. Clearly, Bakke's claim does not fit into categories that previously
claimed a "strict scrutiny-compelling state interest" analysis.
(a) He claims no recognized "fundamental right."
(b) Bakke doesn't fit into a class with any of the traditional indicia of
suspectness: "saddled with such disabilities, subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of po-
litical powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."250
(c) Nor did the University "contravene the cardinal principle that racial
classifications that stigmatize . . . are invalid without more."251
3. However, simply because the preferential admissions facts do not
require "strict scrutiny" as a "suspect classification," the case need not
be analyzed "by applying the very loose rational basis standard of re-
view that is the very least that is always applied in equal protection
cases."
252
4. The preferential admissions situation is comparable to classifica-
tions based on sex (gender) and illegitimacy "because of the significant
risk that racial classifications established for ostensibly benign purposes
can be misused, causing effects not unlike those created by invidious
classifications.
253
Accordingly, the Brennan opinion establishes a twofold test for pref-
erential racial admissions: (1) "[a]n important and articulated purpose
for its use must be shown." (The intermediate standard of the sex
cases);254 and (2) "[a]ny statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any
group or that singles out those least represented in the political process
to bear the brunt of a benign program. '"255 The opinion goes on to find
that the Davis program met these tests, and accordingly, was constitu-
tional against equal protection attack. The "articulated purpose of
remedying the effects of past societal discrimination ' 25 6 was sufficiently
important "to justify the use of a race-conscious admissions pro-
gram '257 but only under the specific circumstances, found here: "[A]
sound basis for concluding that minority underrepresentation is sub-
stantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination is
250. Id. at 357, quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 358.
253. Id. at 361.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 362.
257. Id.
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impeding access of minorities to the medical school. '25s As we shall
see, Justice Powell's disagreement with these criteria is substantial. Is it
noteworthy that no other member of the Court was willing to join in his
opinion? Or is it more noteworthy that the Brennan opinion failed to
attract the fifth Justice that would have denied Bakke entrance to Davis
Medical School?
Finally, we come to the third major opinion in Bakke-that of Jus-
tice Powell. As already noted, the Powell opinion proceeds on the as-
sumption that the standards of Title VI and those of the equal
protection clause are identical. In this regard Powell agrees with the
Brennan Four. However, because of his narrower view of the permissi-
ble scope of affirmative action under the equal protection clause, he
joins the Stevens Four, who rely totally on Title VI, to affirm the Cali-
fornia court and direct Bakke's admission. Seemingly Powell's sole
agreement with the equal protection analysis of the Brennan Four was
to reverse that portion of the California court judgment which enjoined
the Medical School "from according any consideration to race in its
admissions process .... -25' The margin of consideration Powell
would allow race in admission was narrow indeed. If his version of
equal protection were to become Court doctrine, the permissible scope
of affirmative action would become severely constricted. The drift of
Powell's opinion may be seen in the format of questions he poses and
answers:
1. Q. Does a right of action for private parties exist under Title VI?
A. In view of the fact that this question was "neither argued nor
decided in either of the courts below ... [w]e do not address
this difficult issue .... We assume only for the purposes of
this case that respondent [Bakke] has a right of action under
Title VI."
2 60
In other words there were not five Justices on the Court-only the
Stevens Four-who held that a private right of action under Title VI
existed. According to the Stevens Four, it was Title VI alone, and ac-
cording to Powell it was the equal protection clause (which to him, as
to the Brennan Four, measured the scope of Title VI) which entitled
Bakke to admission:
2. Q. Is "the guarantee of equal protection to all persons" to be in-
terpreted in view of the Slaughter-House conception "of its
primary function as bridging the vast distance between mem-
bers of the Negro race and the white 'majority' "?
A. No. "It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal
protection to all persons permits the recognition of special
wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that ac-
258. Id.
259. Id. at 272.
260. Id. at 283.
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corded others." "The fourteenth amendment is not directed
solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory'-that
is, based upon differences between 'white' and Negro." 261
Powell was aware, of course, that no one was contending that the four-
teenth amendment was "solely" directed in favor of the new black citi-
zens. He conceded that "[t]he Court's initial view of the fourteenth
amendment was that its 'one pervading purpose'" was "the freedom of
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and
the protection of the newly-made free man and citizen from the oppres-
sions of those who had formerly exercised dominion over him" 26 2 (cit-
ing Slaughter-House Cases). As we have seen, even the Slaughter-
House Cases conceded that equality of others than blacks was assured
by the equal protection clause. But Powell argued that with the expan-
sion of equal protection to cover basic rights "it was no longer possible
to peg the guarantees of the [flourteenth [a]mendment to the struggle
for equality of one racial minority. 2 63 He grants that in the past thirty
years "the landmark decisions in this area arose in response to the con-
tinued exclusion of Negroes from the mainstream of American soci-
ety," and that "they could be characterized as involving discrimination
by the 'majority' white race against the Negro minority. ' 264 But Powell
refuses either to read them that way, or to recognize that decisions in
this period have themselves pointed out a continuing broader scope to
equal protection when considered in the context of that traditional
black-white discrimination. He concludes that "it is the individual who
is entitled to judicial protection against classifications based upon his
racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon
personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his member-
ship in a particular group . ",265
3. Q. What is the equal protection test when "political judgements
regarding the necessity for [a] particular classification . . .
touch upon an individual's race or ethnic background"?
A. "[H]e is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he
is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest. The Constitution guaran-
tees that right to every person regardless of his back-
ground.
266
Justice Blackmun (a member of the Brennan Four) in a separate dis-
senting opinion agreed with Powell that "fourteenth amendment rights
are personal, that racial and ethnic distinctions where they are stereo-
261. Id. at 295.
262. Id. at 291.
263. Id. at 292. Justice Powell here cited Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
264. 438 U.S. at 294.
265. Id. at 299.
266. Id.
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types are inherently suspect and call for exacting judicial scrutiny," and
that "the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment has expanded beyond its original
1868 conception and now . . . embraces a 'broader principle.' "267
However, he then sharply criticizes Powell's conclusion:
This enlargement does not mean for me, however, that the [f]ourteenth
[a]mendment has broken away from its moorings and its original in-
tended purposes. Those original aims persist. And that, in a distinct
sense, is what 'affirmative action,' in the face of proper facts, is all
about. If this conflicts with idealistic equality, that tension is original
[f]ourteenth [a]mendment tension, constitutionally conceived and con-
stitutionally imposed, and it is part of the [a]mendment's very nature
until complete equality is achieved in the area. In this sense, constitu-
tional equal protection is a shield.268
The basic issue in Bakke, and in future affirmative action cases, will
probably never be more clearly drawn than in this exchange. The only
question remaining for Justice Powell was how the traditional "strict
scrutiny" test would be applied to the Bakke facts.
In discussing earlier the decisions of the California and Washington
state courts on preferential admissions in Bakke, and in DeFunis, we
saw that both courts had concluded, as did Justice Powell, that the
"strict scrutiny-compelling state interest" should be applied to test the
constitutionality of preferential racial admissions. Whereas the Wash-
ington court had found a compelling state interest had been shown, the
California court in Bakke did not. Justice Powell sorted out what he
conceived to be the strongest arguments to justify preferential admis-
sions in Bakke, and agreed with the California Court that they did not
constitute a sufficiently substantial basis for upholding the "suspect
classification" of race. Powell's analysis here is worth pursuing for its
relevance to future Supreme Court decisions in this area.
At the outset Powell identified the version of "strict scrutiny" that he
would employ: "[T]o justify the use of a suspect classification, a State
must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissi-
ble and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary to
the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its inter-
est." '26 9 He then identified four possible chief purposes of the preferen-
tial admissions program:
A. "[Rleducing the historic deficit of traditionally favored minorities
in medical schools and the medical profession."' 70
Following his analysis that what would be bad if done for whites is
bad if done for blacks, Powell stated that "such a purpose must be re-
267. 1d. at 405.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 305.
270. Id. at 306.
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jected not merely as insubstantial but as facially invalid."' 27' His prop-
osition was categoric: "Preferring members of any one group for no
reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own
sake. 272
B. "[Clountering the effects of societal discrimination." 273
In what may prove to be the most durably persuasive part of his
opinion, Justice Powell concedes that the state has "a legitimate and
substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the
disabling effects of identified discrimination. '274 He points out that in
the school integration cases, race-conscious relief was given to "redress
the wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination. "275
That race-conscious relief followed upon judicial determination of con-
stitutional discrimination. There had been no contention in Bakke that
deliberate discrimination at Davis Medical School preceded the institu-
tion of the preferential racial admissions program. The faculty's justifi-
cation for the program was that there had been a general "societal
discrimination" against blacks, and other beneficiaries. To Powell "so-
cietal discrimination" is an "amorphous concept of injury that may be
ageless in its reach into the past." 276 And yet, somewhat surprisingly,
he does not reject it out of hand. "We have never approved a classifica-
tion that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized
groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of
judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or stat-
utory violations. "277 Even if the Davis faculty had made such findings
of "societal discrimination" prior to instituting its preferential admis-
sions program, this would not have sufficed to meet Powell's test. The
findings must be made, he says, if not by the courts or legislature, then
by high executive authority with broad policy-making authority.
C. "[I]ncreasing the number of physicians who will practice in com-
munities currently underserved. ' 278
Such a reason, Powell holds, would be sufficiently substantial, if
proved. "But there is virtually no evidence in the record indicating that
petitioner's special admissions program is either needed or geared to
promote that goal. '279
D. "[O]btaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically
diverse student body."28°
271. Id. at 307.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 306.




278. Id. at 306.
279. Id. at 310.
280. Id. at 306.
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Here, and here alone, Powell finds a possible basis upon which race
might be used as a factor-if one among several-in connection with
an admissions program. Tantalizingly, even here Powell does not
make the concession without calling into his equation special consider-
ations of academic freedom that derive from the first amendment. Of
course, the Davis preferential racial admissions program does not sat-
isfy Powell's requirements-because clearly race was the single factor
which excluded plaintiff, Bakke, from being admitted to the sixteen re-
served seats in Davis' Medical School. "The diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifica-
tions and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single
though important element."28' Powell quoted as an example the
Harvard College admissions program:
In recent years Harvard College has expanded the concept of diver-
sity to include students from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic
groups. Harvard College now recruits not only Californians or Loui-
sianians but also blacks and Chicanos and other minority students
... .In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant that race
has been a factor in some admission decisions. When the Committee
on Admissions reviews the large middle group of applicants who are
'admissible' and deemed capable of doing good work in their courses,
the race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as geo-
graphic origin or a life spent on the farm may tip the balance in other
candidates' cases.282
These considerations are, at most, modest concessions by Powell.
In his special dissent Justice Blackmun found fault with Powell here
again:
I am not convinced, as Mr. Justice Powell seems to be, that the differ-
ence between the Davis program and the one employed by Harvard is
very profound or constitutionally significant. The line between the two
is a thin and indistinct one . . . .The cynical, of course, may say that
under a program such as Harvard's one may accomplish covertly what
Davis concedes it does openly.283
Powell takes account of this jibe, and rejects it. "A facial intent to
discriminate . . . is evident in petitioner's [Davis'] preference program
and not denied in this case. No such facial infirmity exists in an admis-
sions program where race or ethnic background is simply one ele-
ment-to be weighed fairly against other elements-in the selection
process. 284 Again, there surfaces the meaning in equal protection con-
text of "discriminate." To Blackmun "despite its two-track aspect, the
Davis program, for me, is within constitutional grounds, though per-
281. Id. at 315.
282. Id. at 316.
283. Id. at 406.
284. Id. at 318.
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haps barely so. I am not unwilling to infer a constitutional viola-
tion."28
Powell's entire opinion swings about his refusal to concede that
equal protection today could be construed in light of an original central
purpose to advance black integration in American society. New non-
racial aspects of equal protection (fundamental rights) erased that ear-
lier vision, he says, and the emergence of deprived minority groups
other than blacks made it impossible to maintain intelligibly.
When the Supreme Court handed down its complex judgment and
discordant opinions in Bakke, general comment about the case often
proceeded as if Justice Powell's opinion was the controlling word from
the Court about the equal protection clause in an affirmative action
context. Certainly university admissions officers have been strongly
disposed to follow the nooks and crannies of the Powell opinion in se-
verely restricting their preferential racial admissions. This result may
benignly be attributed to natural indisposition to make oneself a target
to be another Davis, when confronted by another Bakke. Certainly
lower federal courts are under no such restraints. Should they, at least,
not now feel freer, in light of the 1979 Weber 86 case, to underscore that
in Bakke Powell spoke for only one member of the Court, where Bren-
nan spoke for four?
V. WEBER: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN LIGHT OF TITLE VII
Is there a significant interrelation between Bakke and Weber? This
question should be considered in the light of numerous possible dis-
claimers. As we have seen, Bakke may be viewed, partially at least, as
a constitutional equal protection decision, or alternatively, as a statu-
tory decision based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It may
be viewed as a constitutional decision to the extent that the Brennan
Four failed by one vote to secure a constitutional basis for preferential
racial admissions, and to the extent that Justice Powell's key vote, as
part of a five to four majority favoring Bakke, was based squarely on
his view of the fourteenth amendment. Arguably, Bakke is in part a
Title VI decision because that was the sole ground on which the Ste-
vens Four, favoring Bakke, relied. But there was not a solid majority
in Bakke rooted in either Title VI or in equal protection, save for a
single point: Justice Powell agreed with the Brennan Four that the
equal protection clause did not prevent the Davis Medical School
"from according any consideration to race in its admission process." '287
Weber clearly does not decide a constitutional issue. It concerns the
285. Id. at 406.
286. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
287. 438 U.S. at 272.
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interpretation to be accorded a statute passed by Congress, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII deals exclusively with regulation
by Congress under its commerce clause power to regulate conditions of
employment in interstate commerce. Its general thrust is to prevent
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, national origin,
and religion. Of all the titles of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it has the
most precise and extensive legislative history. Title VI, considered in
Bakke, prevents discrimination in programs using federal funds. Al-
though it is part of the same statute, unlike Title VII it "was an exercise
of federal power over a matter in which the Federal Government was
already directly involved." '288 This federal power lay in Congress' right
"to assure federal funds would not be used in an improper manner." '289
Because Title VII "was enacted pursuant to the commerce power to
regulate purely private decisionmaking," it was "not intended to incor-
porate and particularize the commands of the [flifth and [f]ourteenth
[ajmendments. '' 290 So it cannot be said that any decision made in
Bakke, or elsewhere, concerning Title VI or the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, would govern a Title VII case such as
Weber.
The strongly held differences expressed by the Court in Weber shall
be set out, and the place of the decision within other discrimination law
under Title VII shall be considered. Whether the Weber decision offers
a basis for a solid conjecture as to the present position of the Supreme
Court on the question left so jumbled in Bakke, the constitutional
equal protection limits on affirmative action programs, shall also be
considered.
Until 1974, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation's plant in
Gramercy, Louisiana, hired its craft workers only among persons with
extensive prior craft experience. Few blacks had this experience, and
consequently only 5 of 273 craft workers at Gramercy (1.83%) were
black. Under stimulus from the United States Department of Labor's
Office of Contract Compliance (hereinafter referred to as OFCC), Kai-
ser entered into a master collective bargaining agreement with the
United Steelworkers of America covering employment conditions at
Gramercy and fourteen other Kaiser plants. Among its provisions was
the establishment of black craft hiring goals equal to the percentage of
blacks in the local work force, which in the Gramercy area was thirty-
nine percent black. The Kaiser-Steelworkers contract agreed to the es-
tablishment of on-the-job training programs to help meet the craft hir-
ing goals. Instead of recruiting already skilled craft workers, the plants
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would teach unskilled workers already employed at the plants the nec-
essary skills for employment as craft workers. The labor agreement
provided that fifty percent of the openings in these on-the-job training
programs would be reserved for black workers. The plan would con-
tinue until a number of black craft workers achieved representation
equal to the black component of the local work force, that is, thirty-
nine percent black. At Gramercy during 1974, seven of the thirteen
craft trainees selected were black, six white. The white applicants were
selected on the basis of seniority, but several white workers who were
rejected had more seniority than some blacks who were taken into the
program in accordance with the fifty percent black quota arrangement.
Brian Weber, one of the whites not accepted, sued Kaiser and the
union in the United States District Court, charging that his exclusion
from the on-the-job training programs solely because of race consti-
tuted a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One need
only read the express words of section 703(a) of the statute to see that
his contention was a strong one:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) to limit or clas-
sify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
291
Section 703(d) of Title VII was even more to the point:
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, la-
bor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling ap-
prenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job
training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his
race, color, religion, sex or national origin in admission to, or employ-
ment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other
training.29
2
Section 7030) went right to the issue of preferences to avoid racial (and
other) imbalances in the job force:
(j) Nothing in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-manage-
ment committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential
treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex or national origin of such individual or group on account
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
291. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1976)).
292. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(d), 78 Stat. 256 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(d) (1976)).
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percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex or national origin
employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by
any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to member-
ship by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any
apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the
available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
293
The statutory language was reinforced by a 1976 Supreme Court deci-
sion in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation CO. 2 94 that the anti-
discrimination mandate of Title VII applied to "any individual"-
white or black.
The McDonald opinion expressly left open whether Title VII banned
voluntary affirmative action plans. However, its extensive survey of the
legislative history of Title VII did not suggest any exception that would
appear to withstand the strong statutory language just quoted.
Noting that the Kaiser plan was voluntary, and not required, the
Weber Court held that "Title VII does not prohibit such race-conscious
affirmative action plans. 295 Writing for the majority was Justice Bren-
nan. He was joined by the three Justices (Blackmun, Marshall, and
White) who had joined him in Bakke, and by Justice Stewart, who had
been teamed with the Stevens Four in Bakke, which decided that case
on the sole basis of Title VI. Not included among the seven members
of the Court who decided Weber were writers of two of the three key
opinions in Bakke, Justice Stevens (who disqualified himself, presuma-
bly because Kaiser Aluminum, a former client, was a chief litigant) and
Justice Powell (whose illness prevented his presence at the Court, but
who had been expected to participate in the decision after hearing the
arguments on tape).
Justice Brennan framed narrowly the question to be decided by the
Court: "[wihether Congress, in Title VII . . . left employers and un-
ions in the private sector free to take such race-conscious steps to elimi-
nate racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories. 2 96
The Court's answer was also sharply honed: "We hold that Title VII
does not prohibit such race-conscious affirmative action plans."2 97
The Court's opinion offered two bases for sustaining the voluntary
affirmative action program. The primary reason given was a frank re-
sort to what the Court called the "spirit" of the statute. Conceding that
Weber's argument from the express statutory language (cited above) "is
293. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(j), 78 Stat. 257 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(j) (1976)).
294. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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not without force,"29 Justice Brennan contended that his "reliance
upon a literal construction of [sections] 703(a) and (d) is misplaced."2 99
Noting that McDonald had reserved the specific question now before
the Court, Brennan argued that these sections of the statute must "be
read against the background of the legislative history of Title VII and
the historical context from which the Act arose." 3" The Court con-
cluded that "[e]xamination of those sources makes clear that an inter-
pretation of the sections that forbade all race-conscious affirmative
action would 'bring about an end completely at variance with the pur-
pose of the statute' and must be rejected.""'' To the majority:
Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial
discrimination in Title VII ... was with 'the plight of the Negro in our
economy.' . . .
Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights Act-the integra-
tion of blacks into the mainstream of American society--could not be
achieved unless [the] trend [of increasing black unemployment] were
reversed. And Congress recognized that that would not be possible un-
less blacks were able to secure jobs 'which have a future. '302
This last reference was to the aim of the craft training program at Kai-
ser to qualify blacks for more advanced jobs. Given this background
the majority "cannot agree . . . that Congress intended to prohibit the
private sector from taking effective steps to accomplish the goal that
Congress designed Title VII to achieve."3 3 Finally, the Court added:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those
who had 'been excluded from the American dream for so long' . . .
constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private,
race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segrega-
tion and hierarchy. 3°
After this broadside, the Court's second and "reinforcing" reason
seems tame, and almost a makeweight. The Court purported to see in
the Congressional language and the legislative history of section 7030)
that Congress had deliberately declined to ban voluntary "racially pref-
erential integration efforts."3 °5 Congress had written in section 7030)
that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer [or others] . . . to grant [racially] preferential treatment to
. . . any apprenticeship or other training program. ... . But, said
298. Id. at 201.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 201-02.
302. Id. at 202-03.
303. Id. at 204.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 205.
306. Id. at 205 n.5.
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Brennan, Congress did not say that it refused to '"permit" such a private
affirmative action program.3 °7
The Court's decision was a narrow one. It was limited to voluntary
affirmative action plans "designed to eliminate conspicuous racial im-
balance in traditionally segregated job categories."3 8 It warned that
the plan here approved "does not unnecessarily trammel the interests
of white employees."30 9 The Kaiser plan did not require discharge of
white workers in favor of blacks. Half of those included in the training
program were whites. The plan was temporary-it would end when
the black participants "approximate" the thirty-nine percentage of
blacks in the local work force. The target of this plan was not "to
maintain racial balance"; it was "simply to eliminate a manifest racial
imbalance. 31 ° Nevertheless, as we have seen, the untraditional statu-
tory analysis employed by the Court did not feature a close construc-
tion of the statute's language, or of its legislative history. Rather it
frankly reached out to what the Court saw as the basic sweeping pur-
pose of the statute. It adjusted "difficult" statutory language to fit with
the goal of the Civil War Amendments cited in the Slaughter-House
Cases which, according to the Court, had been renewed by Congress in
the 1964 Civil Rights Act-"the integration of blacks into the main-
stream of American society.
31
'
Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist wrote sharp dis-
sents. Rehnquist argued that the specifics of Congressional debate re-
inforced and explained the statutory language of sections 703(a) and
(d). It was so clear as not to require explanation. Justice Blackmun,
who joined Brennan's opinion for the Court, wrote separately: "I share
some of the misgivings expressed in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent
. .. concerning the extent to which the legislative history of Title VII
clearly supports the result the Court reaches today. '312 Still he joined
in the Court's opinion and judgment. In explaining his conclusion,
Blackmun surfaced reasons, omitted from the Brennan opinion, that
had been prominent in the litigation of the case in the courts below and
in the Supreme Court itself. "I believe that additional considerations,
practical and equitable, only partially perceived, if perceived at all by
the [Eighty-Eighth] Congress [in 1964], support the conclusion reached
by the Court today . . . ,,313 The "practical" consideration was that
the dissent would place "voluntary compliance with Title VII in
307. Id.
308. Id. at 209.
309. Id. at 208.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 202.
312. Id. at 209.
313. Id.
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profound jeopardy."'314 If an employer (even under pressure of the fed-
eral Office of Contract Compliance) decided to attempt some form of
affirmative action, he would be subject to suit by white employees, such
as Weber. On the other hand if he declined to take such steps, he might
be subject to suit by blacks for past discrimination. But more interest-
ing was Blackmun's suggestion that "[s]trong considerations of equity
support an interpretation of Title VII that would permit private affirm-
ative action to reach where Title VII itself does not." '315 To Justice
Blackmun it was "unfair" for Weber to argue that "the asserted scarcity
of black craftsmen in Louisiana, the product of historic discrimination,
makes Kaiser's training program illegal because it ostensibly absolves
Kaiser of all Title VII liability." '316 By this he meant that Kaiser could
not be held a discriminator for failing to hire non-existent black
craftsmen. To Blackmun "[t]he bargain struck in 1964 with the passage
of Title VII guaranteed equal opportunity for white and black alike,
but where Title VII provides no remedy for blacks, it should not be
construed to foreclose private affirmative action from supplying re-
lief."3 7 Blackmun offers a formula to capsule this view: "Absent com-
pelling evidence of legislative intent, I would not interpret Title VII
itself as a means of 'locking in' the effects of segregation for which Title
VII provides no remedy. Such a construction, as the Court points out,
. . . would be 'ironic,' given the broad remedial purposes of Title
VII."3 18
Justice Blackmun refers to a "high tightrope without a net beneath
them ' 31 9 that the employer and the union must walk if voluntary af-
firmative action plans are barred. To understand their dilemma it is
necessary to look briefly at the body of discrimination law under Title
VII. The Supreme Court from the start had given strong support to the
broad language of section 703(a) making it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer "to limit or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, ' 320 particularly in matters
concerning racial discrimination. A showing of "discriminatory im-
pact" on a basis of race was held to violate Title VII (Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. ,321 1971), and apparently neutral practices that had a dis-
proportionate impact upon blacks were held barred. A strong showing
314. Id. at 210.
315. Id. at 214.
316. Id. at 214-15.
317. Id. at 214.
318. Id. at 215.
319. The phrase was Judge Wisdom's, dissenting, in the Court of Appeals. Id. at 210.
320. Id. at 199 n.2.
321. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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was required to come within the statutory exception of business neces-
sity (Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,32 2 1975). Strong remedies for past
discrimination were approved by the Court, including back pay and
sometimes insertion of a discriminatee into the place he or she would
have had except for the racial discrimination. The lower federal courts
had indicated that this might go so far as to permit displacement of
seniority rights of white workers in favor of black discriminatees. In
1977 this impression was corrected by the Supreme Court in Teamsters
v. United States,3 23 an opinion by Justice Stewart that soundly rejected
displacement of white workers' seniority rights as a remedy for past
discrimination. However, after a showing of past discrimination, some
lower federal courts, without reproof from the Supreme Court, did use
the remedy of affirmative action in the sense of race-conscious job quo-
tas. The litigants and lower courts in Weber assumed that there may be
remedial use by a court of job quotas once a court found past discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII. But this point was not crucial since the
lower courts found that Kaiser had not been guilty of past racial dis-
crimination. The point of the case was that the Kaiser-Steelworkers'
job training plan was voluntary even though it was instituted arguably
to forestall a later suit by blacks. All members of the Court in Weber
assumed: (1) that Title VII barred any governmental action to require
a race-conscious affirmative action plan; and (2) that after findings of
past discrimination, courts may (despite the statute) order a race-con-
scious quota. The question open in Weber was whether a voluntary
agreement by private parties could use race-conscious quotas despite
Title VII's bar to government-compelled racial quotas and in the ab-
sence of a court's finding of past discrimination. The Court's answer in
Weber was yes, provided that the voluntary affirmative action plan was
"designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in traditionally
segregated job categories. 324
Three factors suggest that Weber is a highly significant bellweather
of where the Court is headed in matters of racial discrimination,
whether statutory under the Civil Rights Acts or constitutional under
the equal protection clause: the actual result, the extraordinary way in
which it was reached, and the presence in the Court's five man majority
of Justice Stewart.
A. The Actual Result
Despite Bakke's doctrinal inconclusiveness, which we discussed ear-
lier, its result wreaked havoc upon the will of university administrators
322. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
323. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
324. 443 U.S. at 209.
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to proceed with racial affirmative action admission plans. If Weber
had outlawed voluntary employment plans, judicial and administrative
use of affirmative action quotas as remedies for past discrimination
would be greatly reduced, if not eliminated (short of Congressional
amendment of Title VII). Even in Weber the Court seems to be serving
notice that it will carefully scrutinize court-approved job quotas in re-
medial cases. However, even with judicial and administrative use of
job quotas as affirmative action remedying past discrimination, no
court-oriented or administrative program can succeed without rein-
forcement by voluntary action. Enforcement solely by individual court
cases brought by discriminatees is inadequate--cases proceed too
slowly and are too costly. Clearly, as Justice Blackmun, at least, ac-
knowledged, the voluntary plan is the linchpin of success in turning
back discrimination in employment. Weber now makes that possible,
but only in appropriate cases ("conspicuous racial imbalance in tradi-
tionally segregated job categories").3 25
The most important aspect of Weber is its result. Had the Court
gone the other way, on whatever reasoning, the days of affirmative job
action were numbered. Justice Powell's clarion call in Bakke for an
end to the Slaughter-House preferred position for blacks in equal pro-
tection would seem to be Court doctrine of the future. The result in
Weber assures that the Brown era continues with additional modula-
tions. At Justice White's hand the Court, in Washington v. Davis326
(1976), had insisted upon intentional violation to ground an equal pro-
tection violation. At Justice Stewart's hand, the Court in Teamsters v.
United States3 27 (1977) had curtailed the remedy for. past discrimina-
tion short of displacing vested seniority rights of white workers. In
Bakke the Court (by whatever combination of reasons) had balked at a
straight racial quota for educational admissions without a stronger j us-
tification than that record showed. In Bakke, even the Brennan Four
had stipulated that to justify constitutionally a racial quota there must
be shown a "substantial relation to an important governmental inter-
est."'3 28 Finally, in Weber Justice Brennan warns that the Court's opin-
ion does not "define in detail the line of demarcation between
permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans. 329 In holding
the Kaiser plan "permissible," he stresses the Court's continued regard
(as in Teamsters and Bakke) for fairness to "the interests of the white
employees."33 And, as just noted, he further limits private sector dis-
325. Id.
326. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
327. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
328. 438 U.S. at 361.
329. 443 U.S. at 208.
330. Id.
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cretion to "affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous
racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." 33'
The result in Weber signals continuation of the Brown era, with its
reawakened consciousness of the goal of the Civil War Amendments
and Civil Rights Acts-"the integration of blacks into the mainstream
of American society. 33 2 However, as in Davis, Teamsters, and Bakke
itself, this goal would be pursued with a refined awareness of fairly
asserted rights of whites and others.
B. The Court's Reasoning
Few more acerbic dissents can be found than Justice Rehnquist's in
Weber. He calls the decision Orwellian, (recalling 1984), representing
a "dramatic and equally unremarked switch in this Court's interpreta-
tion of Title VII. ''3 33 Rehnquist cites Supreme Court decisions that
found that the legislative history makes it "clear beyond cavil that the
obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for
each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members
of the applicant's race are already proportionately represented in the
work force. '3 34 Now, he says, "We are told that the legislative history
of Title VII shows that employers are free to discriminate on the basis
of race. ' 33 5 Reminding the Court of "the oft-stated principle that our
duty is to construe rather than to rewrite legislation, '336 he ridicules the
Court's resort to the "familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the intention of its makers." '337 It is
only by a "tour deforce reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes
and Hughes, but of escape artists such as Houdini, [that] the Court
eludes clear statutory language. ' 338 Rehnquist does not content him-
self with rhetoric; he patiently and freshly explores the Congressional
debates and Committee Reports and cites them in support of his posi-
tion. Far from replying in kind, both Justice Brennan (in the Court's
opinion) and Justice Blackmun (in his concurrence) seem sensitive to
Rehnquist's frustration. Brennan: "Respondent's argument [much like
Rehnquist's] is not without force." '339 Blackmun: "I share some of the
misgivings expressed in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent . . . concern-
ing the extent to which the legislative history of Title VII clearly sup-
331. Id. at 209.
332. In Weber this purpose was ascribed to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 202.
333. Id. at 220.
334. Id. at 221, quoting Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 201, quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
338. Id. at 222.
339. Id. at 201.
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ports the result the Court reaches today."34 Clearly, an opinion
supporting Weber's position would have been easier to write. The fact
that the Court went out of its way to avoid doing so, and the reasons it
gave for so doing, are almost as important as the result reached. As we
have seen, in Weber the Court takes as its categorical imperative the
aim of the Civil War Amendments, and the Civil Rights Acts enacted
by Congress: "the integration of blacks in the mainstream of American
society"; and the specific aim of the Congress which enacted Title VII
in 1964 pursuant to the commerce power: "to open employment oppor-
tunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally
closed to them .... 341 Interestingly, as a secondary argument, the
Court's opinion does resort to a rather narrow point of statutory inter-
pretation (concerning section 703(0)).3 42 But it frankly bases its result
primarily on the overriding principle of black integration.
Nor does the Court opinion take the narrowest possible ground for
the restrictive formula that it finally pronounces. Justice Blackmun
would have preferred the course proposed by Judge Wisdom in his dis-
sent in the court of appeals. Wisdom would have permitted a volun-
tary race-conscious quota only to the extent that "employers and
unions who had committed 'arguable violations' of Title VII should be
free to take reasonable responses without fear of liability to whites.' 343
In order to defend a voluntary quota they must show: (1) without con-
ceding that their past conduct had been discriminatory that it was at
least arguably so; and (2) that their response was "reasonable" in light
of the arguable violation. 3" The Court's formula, on the other hand,
requires only a showing that the plan (1) was designed to eliminate
"conspicuous racial imbalance," and (2) in "traditionally segregated
job categories. '345 Both these conditions were clearly met here, said
the Court: (1) The black employment at Gramercy was only 1.83% in
an area whose work force was 39% black; (2) "Judicial findings of ex-
clusion from crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to make such
exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice. 34 6 In addition, as we
have seen, the Court warned that the plan approved in Weber "does
not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees." 347 As
Justice Blackmun notes, the Court's approach substantially expands
upon the "arguable violation" situation. Yet he found it "acceptable"
and joined in the Court's opinion. The Court's formula permits a vol-
340. Id. at 209.
341. Id. at 203, quoting Senator Humphrey, one of the managers of the bill in the Senate.
342. See text accompanying note 292 supra.
343. 443 U.S. at 211.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 209.
346. Id. at 198 n.l.
347. Id. at 208.
65
Broderick: Bakke, Weber and Mr. Justice Stewart: Constitutional Theory and A
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1979
68 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
untary plan even though there is a mere statistical showing of "pur-
poseful exclusion of blacks from the job category, resulting in a
persistent disparity between the proportion of blacks in the labor force
and the proportion of blacks who hold jobs within the category. 348
This is mere societal history, and does not require any showing of po-
tential liability of this employer, as would an "arguable violation" the-
ory.
Both in the overall principle by which the Court justified its decision,
and in the relatively expansive formula which it adopted to measure
permissibility of a voluntary race quota, the Court reestablished its
commitment to the promise held out in the Civil War Amendments, the
ensuing civil rights legislation, and the early Supreme Court pro-
nouncements in Slaughter-House. The Court reaffirmed its immediate
predecessors' rededication to this principle in Brown and subsequent
cases. And the Court seems, in Weber, to dispel fears stirred by Bakke,
that the Court was entering a new era of constitutional and statutory
interpretation in the spirit of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion.3 49 The
margin in Weber was narrow-only five Justices joined the majority.
The question remains whether this majority will remain solid. To an-
swer that question we must look at the position in race cases of the
Court member whose allegiance to the Brennan Four (of Bakke) con-
stituted the five Justice majority in Weber-Mr. Justice Potter Stewart.
VI. JUSTICE STEWART AND THE NEW MAJORITY
In a sense, following the Supreme Court is an art form rather than
the pursuit of a science (law) or of a philosophy (justice). For the com-
ments just made about the importance of the result in Weber, and of
the means used to reach it, depend on one fact-the adherence of Jus-
tice Stewart to the Brennan Four (of Bakke) to constitute a Court ma-
jority in Weber. Since the significance of Weber as an indicator of
future Court action in the race discrimination field depends to a great
extent upon the permanence and solidity of that majority, an inquiry is
in order as to the judicial positioning of Justice Stewart on racial issues.
Justice Holmes once defined "the law" as simply "prophecies of what
the courts will do in fact."35 To those who agree with Holmes, the
constitutional and statutory law on racial issues may well depend on
what Mr. Justice Stewart will do in fact. Can one predict that he will
remain with Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun as a
working Court majority on racial matters, notably those centering on
348... Id. at 212.
349. See text accompanying notes 259-82 supra.
350. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897).
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equal protection and affirmative action? Stewart's history would sug-
gest "yes."
Since we have already discussed most of the relevant cases, our anal-
ysis can be brief. Justice Stewart came to the Court in 1958, four years
after Brown v. Board of Education."' Like other members of the War-
ren Court, he joined in the opinions on school desegregation that re-
mained unanimous until 1971. Later, he softened limitations of the
Burger court in crucial concurring opinions.352
One of the bars to enforcing civil rights for blacks has been, as we
have seen, the requirement of state action. For a time the Supreme
Court lowered this barrier by an increasingly widened view of what
constituted state action. In this sequence Justice Stewart resisted a con-
cept of state action which would enlarge federal control over state af-
fairs in nonracial matters. However, in race cases Stewart labored to
find some specific element that might be singled out as state involve-
ment. Thus, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,3 53 perhaps the
most expansive Court formula extending state action, Stewart con-
curred on the ground that a permissive state statute (ignored by the
Court) was itself enough to constitute state action. United States v.
Guest354 was a prosecution of whites in Georgia under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, for conspiracy to deprive blacks of their constitutional
rights. The indictment was challenged on grounds (citing the Civil
Rights Cases35 5) that the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 on
which the indictment relied was beyond Congress' power to enact. Six
Justices in this case (writing in separate concurring opinions) were pre-
pared to overrule the CivilRights Cases; Justice Stewart found a way in
his opinion for the Court to sustain the indictment without taking this
step. First, he found that this statute was simply an enforcement of
rights secured by the equal protection clause itself; and second, since
the equal protection clause could not be invoked without showing some
state action, Justice Stewart, contrary to the argument of the litigants,
found an element in the indictment he deemed sufficient to constitute
state action. The indictment alleged that one of the means used in the
conspiracy was "causing the arrest of Negroes by means of false re-
ports. '356 Stewart conjectured that this was broad enough to "cover a
charge of active connivance by agents of the State in the making of the
'false reports' . . . .,357 The indictment was thus upheld, and Con-
351. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
352. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974).
353. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
354. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
355. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
356. 383 U.S. at 756.
357. Id.
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gress' enforcement power under the fourteenth amendment was left cir-
cumscribed by the Civil Rights Cases.
In 1966 Stewart acquiesced in upholding of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 under fifteenth amendment power.358 However, in the same year
he joined Justice Harlan's dissent to the expansive use of section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment in Katzenbach v. Morgan,359 as "tantamount
to allowing the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment to swallow the State's consti-
tutionally ordained primary authority in this field. 36 ° Justice Stewart
has been reserved concerning expansion of Congress' powers under the
fourteenth amendment; yet in the celebrated cases we discussed earlier,
Jones v. Mayer3 6 1 (1968) and Grin v. Breckinridge362 (1971) Justice
Stewart found a means to sustain civil rights racial statutes by means of
a broad reinterpretation of the thirteenth amendment (enlarged to em-
brace "badges of servitude," reversing Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v.
Ferguson363 on this point). Stewart was the Court leader here.
Justice Stewart joined with the majority in DeFunis v. Odegaard364 in
refusing on grounds of mootness to pass on the constitutionality of
Washington's preferential admissions program. He joined with Justice
White's opinion for the Court in Washington v. Davis365 (1976) which
specified that intentional discrimination was an ingredient of the four-
teenth amendment equal protection. Stewart's opinions in the Title VII
area strongly enforced that statute. In 1971 he joined Chief Justice
Burger's firm interpretation of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 366
as reaching non-intentional racial discrimination, and wrote the even
narrower interpretation of the "business necessity" defense in Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.367 Not until Teamsters v. United States368
(1977), when Stewart's opinion for the Court refused to displace senior-
ity rights of white employees, was he counted on a side that drew a line
on enforcement of Title VII rights. He did not join in Justice White's
opinion in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey369
that made "stigma" a distinguishing factor in the intention required for
an equal protection violation. However, his concurring opinion in that
case, joined by Justice Powell, seemed to accept all except the word
"stigma."
358. See text accompanying notes 187-92 supra.
359. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
360. Id. at 671.
361. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
362. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
363. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
364. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
365. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
366. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
367. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
368. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
369. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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In this continuously supportive, and often leadership role upholding
black discrimination claims, Justice Stewart plainly could be identified
at the time of the Bakke argument in 1978 as a Justice likely to be
aligned with what proved to be the Brennan Four. However, he stood
aloof and did not join them. Neither did he join Justice Powell (with
whom he is frequently aligned). He joined the "ducking quartet" led
by Justice Stevens, who rested their votes in Bakke strictly on the Title
VI (federal funds) provision.
When Weber was argued, it was clear that the Brennan Four must
recruit a vote from among Justices Powell, Stewart, Stevens, Burger,
and Rehnquist. The last two were most unlikely candidates. Justice
Powell, whose differences with the Brennan Four were posted in his
Bakke opinion, was an improbable recruit. It developed that he did
not attend the argument because of illness, although he kept open the
possibility that he might participate in the decision. Justice Stevens
had not made his race views clear, but a pronouncement in a recent sex
discrimination case3 71 might seem to tilt him away from the Brennan
Four. In fact, he disqualified himself from judging Weber, presumably
for what he conceived as a conflict of interest, Kaiser being a former
client. That left Justice Stewart. He did, as we see, join the Court's
Weber opinion without demurring to a single line.
The question in these discussions has been whether his alignment
with them on this race issue is casual, or is it on a principled basis and
likely to be enduring? His track record, as set forth above, suggests that
his Bakke alignment, if anything, was the deviation. His Weber vote
seems in line with his consistent, yet cautious, advancement of the
Slaughter-House/Brown black integration position. He will not accept
uncritically every affirmative action program, but within the cautious
formula of the Weber majority, affirmative action seems safe with him.
With perhaps some further adjustments of terminology, Justice Stewart
could also be at home with the equal protection formulation of the
Brennan Four.3 7 ' If so, Justice Powell's solo effort in Bakke will have
been a one day's wonder that is not likely to affect the current history of
the Court.
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AS "HIGHER LAW"
We have seen, with some attention to historical detail, how the
Supreme Court has used judicial review in two major areas of its work,
due process and equal protection (with a special focus on race), where
370. See Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (a Title VII sex discrimination case).
371. But see Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48 LW 4436
(1980), discussed in note 223 supra. Of course, the fragile Weber majority is obviously subject to
fracture by any change of membership on the Court.
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it has reached, and what twisting course it has pursued. But the ques-
tion remains, are there standards furnished by the American constitu-
tional system as to how the Supreme Court should operate? Must we
be satisfied with Justice Hughes' aphorism: "We live under a constitu-
tion. But the constitution is what the judges say it is."'37 2 Or with a
version of Justice Holmes' definition of "law" as "the prophecies of
what the courts will do in fact." '373 Or with the art of predicting
whether five Justices will seize a principled position, or any position,
and hold to it.
The notion that judicial review rests upon a view of the Constitution
as a "higher law" that is binding on Justices is not a unanimous opin-
ion among constitutional scholars. Professor Lawrence Tribe is content
with the functional view that the Constitution allocates power to the
Court to decide as best it can in areas committed to it, without objective
substantive control from the Constitution itself, or past "principles" or
decisions.374 The late Professor Alexander Bickel rejects what he calls
the "contractarian" (Lockean) view of constitutional interpretation that
presupposes fixed principles as inherent in the Constitution itself.
Bickel does not renounce the view that the Court's decisions should be
founded in principles it has discerned from the constitutional and deci-
sional materials. However, he calls these "middle distance principles"
which can be discarded by the Court as it deems appropriate, and new
ones fashioned in their place.375
Clearly, the Constitution initially institutionalized slavery. Equally
clearly, after a bitter war one generation of Americans amended the
Constitution to wipe out slavery and began to repair the damage it
wrought on black citizens of many generations. It is hard to identify a
more deliberately adopted and enunciated principle in our history than
this one. Yet, after initially identifying it and embracing it (Slaughter-
House), the Court soon departed from it (Civil Rights Cases, Plessy).
Seventy years later the Court returned to it (Brown). The effort of Jus-
372. C. HUGHES, ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 185-86 (2d ed. 1916).
373. Holmes, supra note 350.
374. Tribe's most recent formulation of this position makes an interesting reference to Bakke:
In this period of national questioning and self-doubt, it may be that the most likely consensus
for the Court would be a fairly reactionary one. In a divided nation, the Court's task often
becomes one of pragmatic statecraft. Given the absence of a more enlightened and liberating
consensus, it is perhaps best that the Court proceed by leaving open possibilities for more
constructive constitutional development-even at the price of further doctrinal disarray. Far
from lamenting the inconclusiveness of the Court's Bakke decision, for example, I am in-
clined to applaud the way in which the Court there cleared the path to progressive future
results while accommodating the reservations deeply felt by many with respect to preferential
treatment.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Supp. 1979).
375. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 3-25 (1975). Bickel's central theme is that
"process" as distinguished from "content" is "what the law of the Constitution is about." Id. at
142.
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tice Powell in Bakke to bury it again, as outdated, is in line with Bick-
el's (and Tribe's) constitutional theory. This functional-pragmatic view
may seem harmless (if uncreative) in the Court's development of due
process; its sheer nihilism is apparent in the equal protection history of
racial discrimination. The Supreme Court's standing in public confi-
dence survives, stronger perhaps than that of Congress and the Presi-
dency in this day. But that confidence rests more on the notion that its
decisions are consistent, coherent, rationally explained, andprincoled,
than on the favor one Monday's decision finds with one Monday's pub-
lic. The message of Weber may be that this Supreme Court is reestab-
lishing this concern. Possibly it is also valuing the view that while
constitutional interpretation must have suppleness, every credible sys-
tem of justice must be, in some sense, "contractarian."
POSTSCRIPT
On July 3, 1980, after this article was in type and the presses about to
roll on it for the final time, the Supreme Court handed down a further,
important word on affirmative action-Fullilove v. Kluznick.37 6 In this
case the Court made good on its hint in Weber that we are still in the
Brown era, and that Bakke was an aberration. At stake in Fullilove
was the constitutionality (against an equal protection challenge) of con-
gressional legislation providing that ten percent of all contracts
awarded under a public contracts program (of $4,000,000,000) should
go to "minority business enterprises."
The Court's six to three decision upholding the affirmative action
provision was the product of two opinions. One, written by Justice
Brennan and joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, followed the
analysis of these Justices in both Bakke (dissenting) and Weber. The
second opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Jus-
tices Powell and White. Dissenting, as was predictable from Bakke
and Weber, was Justice Rehnquist. With him, not unexpectedly,377 was
Justice Stevens. The third dissenter - underscoring the flimsiness,
even for practicing lawyers, of Justice Holmes' definition of law-
378
was Justice Stewart. Which brings us back to the question raised at the
outset, "whether the nine supreme decision-makers rely on law, on ac-
cepted principle, or on unreasoned and unpredictable personal prefer-
ence. .. 379
376. 48 U.S.L.W. 4979 (July 2, 1980).
377. See text accompanying note 370 supra.
378. "[P]rophecies of what the courts will do in fact." Holmes, supra note 350.
379. See pp. 3-4 supra.
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